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Today we live in the era of “peak globalisation”. Despite sim-
mering trade disputes, goods, services, and capital easily cross 
national borders. The same holds true when it comes to labour 
migration, at least for the high-skilled, rich global North.
Even as globalisation reached its apex, it took citizens some 
time before they started to fear international trade, finally real-
ising that while trade liberalisation raises average living stand-
ards it might also increase the income gap between the richer 
and the poorer. For international migration, however, it is the 
other way around: citizens look at people crossing national bor-
ders with fear, and it is very hard for them to tackle the issue in 
a more rational, cool-headed manner.
Part of that is due to the fact that people come with “strings 
attached”: when they move, they bring along their culture, 
their education, and their beliefs. This makes it much harder to 
weigh costs and benefits in a rational way, and avoid reactions 
to immigration driven by fear.
By focusing on our emotions and instincts, we often tend 
to lose sight of the big picture. We speak about protecting our 
borders, but do not look at whether alternative, legal channels 
are available to those who may ultimately resort to migrating 
irregularly. And we tend to look at the future with uncertain-
ty and uneasiness, rather than planning for what awaits for us 
down the road – or even just around the corner.
Even today, Europeans continue to look in the rear-view 
mirror. Yet, the 2013-2017 “migration crisis” (the period of 
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high irregular arrivals to Europe) is increasingly in the past. The 
Eastern Mediterranean route – connecting Turkey to Greece 
– reached its peak level of flows in October 2015 (when more 
than 200,000 persons crossed the border irregularly in a single 
month) and ended in early 2016, after the EU-Turkey state-
ment shrunk those flows to a trickle. The same happened in July 
2017 for the Central Mediterranean route, after Italy and the 
EU struck deals with transit countries in sub-Saharan Africa, 
and convinced smugglers in Libya started to detain migrants 
for longer instead of sending them at sea as a consequence of 
more effective control by concerned local authorities.
Of course, today the risk of new, sudden surges in irregular 
migration to Europe is not zero. Spain experienced a significant 
increase as late as 2018. Turkish President Erdoğan threatens to 
send more migrants to Europe even as those currently hosted 
on Greek islands remain in dire conditions. And Libya feels like 
a powder keg, ready to explode.
Moreover, Europe’s public opinion does not seem ready 
to think of the crisis as a thing of the past. According to the 
Eurobarometer survey, in late 2019, 34% of European citizens 
still ranked “immigration” among the most important issues 
the EU has to face. That was down from 58% in 2015, but it 
still left immigration as the first reason for concern to European 
citizens, followed – at a distance – by climate change (22%) 
and the economic situation (18%).
The enduring perception of migration as a threat has gone 
hand in hand with the inability of EU Member States to handle 
the increase in arrivals by showing solidarity to each other. In 
fact, inaction and botched responses have likely entrenched a 
“state of perpetual crisis”. Many still remember the European 
attempts to help Italy and Greece in 2015. Back then, Member 
States formally agreed (not without any complaint) to relocate 
about 100,000 asylum seekers in two years, from countries of 
first arrival in Europe to other countries within the EU. Yet to-
day, four years after the plan was launched, just around 35,000 
persons have actually been relocated, while more than 600,000 
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have made it to Italy, Greece, or Spain over the same timeframe.
Against this background, EU countries have hurriedly at-
tempted to come up with patchwork solutions, acting on three 
fronts. First, they “externalised” border management, by asking 
third countries to stop those already on the way, and discourage 
further departures. Second, they tried to strengthen returns of 
rejected asylum seekers to their countries of origin. Third, they 
leveraged development funds in order to improve conditions in 
countries of origin and transit. In the short run, this strategy of 
containment and local development appears to have paid off, 
with irregular flows crossing the Mediterranean shrinking every 
year since 2015. But will it last and are its costs worth it?
In essence, EU countries still struggle to come up with al-
ternative solutions to foster safe, orderly, and regular migration 
pathways: either for people migrating for work, family and edu-
cation reasons; or for those in need to get protection in Europe 
without risking their lives along the route (although some, in-
cluding Italy, are leading the way in the latter respect). More in 
general, EU countries appear much less eager to look ahead and 
plan accordingly.
This is precisely what the authors of this Report set out to 
do. This Report tries to take a glimpse into the future of mi-
gration to Europe. It analyses the structural trends underlying 
migration flows, the interaction between migration and specific 
policy fields (such as development, border management, and 
integration), and the policies to put in place for safe and orderly 
migration.
In the opening chapter, Matteo Villa and Elena Corradi an-
alyse the structural trends driving migration from Africa to the 
EU, accounting for demographic and economic forces, and 
try to leverage this knowledge to forecast what could happen 
over the next two decades. They focus on Africa, a continent 
geographically close to Europe and with the fastest growing 
population in the world. Africa’s population is set to double 
between 2010 and 2040, from 1 to 2 billion people. However, 
the authors find that migration from Africa to Europe is not 
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expected to follow the same trend. Their findings call for a 
more sensible approach to migration policy, one that puts evi-
dence-based findings centre stage. There is a clear need for prag-
matic attempts to investigate plausible futures, and to avoid ei-
ther scaremongering or minimising the extent of the challenges 
ahead of us.
Marta Foresti and her co-authors show that international mi-
gration poses both challenges and opportunities, and address 
the relationship between migration and the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development. A lack of opportunities and invest-
ment in origin countries can drive migration; but migration 
can also improve development and investment in origin coun-
tries (through remittances and private investment), fill labour 
gaps and foster innovation in host countries, and play a role in 
development along the journey. The authors ask how migra-
tion may contribute to achieving the goals of the 2030 Agenda, 
showing that migration is not a development “problem” to be 
solved, but a mechanism or a strategy that can contribute to the 
achievement of many of the goals.
Michael Clemens, Helen Dempster and Kate Gough ask 
whether economic development in poor countries causes mi-
gration to decrease, or the opposite. The rhetoric of many pol-
icymakers in Europe shows that they believe that, by providing 
aid, they are addressing the “root causes” of emigration and 
therefore reducing further movements across borders. But this 
view is too simplistic, because migration is not (only) driven 
by a lack of economic opportunities. European policymakers 
should target aid at employment creation, and they should be 
putting in place robust border enforcement. But without pro-
moting new kinds of legal labour migration pathways they will 
not be able to manage this movement in the longer-term, or to 
take advantage of the potentially positive impact it could have 
on European labour markets.
Matthieu Tardis and Daniele Albanese put a spotlight on 
forced migration and the need for asylum and international 
protection. They show that protracted crises last an estimated 
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26 years on average, but that there is a lack of durable solutions 
for persons seeking protection. A growing number of persons in 
need have thus embarked on dangerous journeys, often at the 
hands of human smugglers, facing detention and treacherous 
conditions along the way. In Europe, there is therefore a need 
to sustain the momentum gained by discussions around safe 
and legal pathways to obtain protection, be they refugee reset-
tlement or complementary ways such as private or community 
sponsorship programmes.
Eugenio Cusumano looks at the future of irregular migration 
to Europe. These are probably the least predictable of migration 
flows. On the one hand, drivers are manifold, ranging from 
economic conditions to the need for protection. On the other 
hand, they strictly depend on EU and Member States’ policies, 
in particular the shortage of safe and legal pathways to reach 
Europe. By surveying the past two decades of irregular migra-
tion by sea, the author identifies some enduring dynamics and 
plausible future scenarios, concluding that the demographic 
and socioeconomic outlook of MENA and sub-Saharan coun-
tries suggests that northbound irregular migratory flows are set 
to continue. In the short term, however, the large-scale mobili-
ty flows triggered by the Arab uprisings will remain unmatched 
short of any new major regional turmoil, while EU policies 
based on border externalisation are set to remain part of the EU 
migration governance toolkit.
Finally, Enrico Coletta and the Ernst & Young team focus 
on migrant integration in Europe. They show that while the ad-
vent of new technologies, such as AI, blockchain, and Big Data 
is disrupting the connection between citizens and communi-
ties, the same technologies can also hold the key to unlocking 
the potential for tailor-made integration policies. When used as 
a strategic tool, new technologies can provide the missing link 
to help deliver better outcomes for both migrants and citizens 
in a more sustainable way. The key is to move further towards 
a “digital State” – one in which the production and delivery 
of information and services inside governments, and between 
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governments and their citizens, is based on a user-centric ap-
proach and ICT-enabled procedures. This can help moving 
from “emergency” and short-sighted responses to “structural”, 
long-term ones.
In conclusion, this Report shows that migration does not 
need to be feared, and neither should it be approached as an 
intractable phenomenon. In fact, the opposite is true. We can 
study past migration, policy responses, and current trends in 
order to glimpse into the future and plan ahead. As we increas-
ingly grasp what shapes migration and its outcomes, we will 
find it much easier to shed our instinctual responses and govern 
the phenomenon, rather than be governed by it.
Paolo Magri
ISPI Executive Vice President and Director
1.  What the Future Holds: 
     Migration from Africa to the EU
Matteo Villa, Elena Corradi
Over the last few years, in Europe the word “migration” has of-
ten gone hand in hand with the word “crisis”, as irregular flows 
to the European Union reached unprecedented levels between 
2014 and 2018. Public opinion and policy makers’ attention 
has dwelled on existing difficulties and immediate responses. 
The EU-Turkey statement in March 2016, and agreements 
with transit countries in Africa (Niger, Ethiopia, and Libya) 
are examples of this short-term approach. Indeed, attempts at 
“externalising” border control have been successful at bringing 
down irregular arrivals to Europe: in 2016, arrivals to Greece 
shrank by 98%, and since mid-2017 arrivals to Italy have fol-
lowed the same pattern (-93%). Evidence however shows that, 
while potentially effective1, restrictive migration policies can-
not stop migration altogether2. This means that, even as the 
European “migration crisis” is now over, its conclusion will not 
1 M. Helbling and D. Leblang, “Controlling Immigration? How Regulations 
Affect Migration Flows”, European Journal of  Political Research, vol. 58, 2019, pp. 
248-269.
2 M. Czaika and H. de Haas, “The effect of  visas on migration processes”, 
International Migration Review, vol. 51, no. 4, 2017, pp.893-926; M. Barslund, M. Di 
Salvo, and L. Ludolph, Can regular replace irregular migration across the Mediterranean?, 
CEPS MEDAM Policy Paper, 27 June 2019; M. Hooghe, A. Trappers, B. 
Meuleman, and T. Reeskens, “Migration to European Countries: A Structural 
Explanation of  Patterns, 1980-2004”, International Migration Review, vol. 42, no. 
2, 2008, pp. 476-504.
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mark the end of irregular immigration to the EU. Long-term 
responses are therefore sorely needed.
At the same time, the belief that migration to the EU will rise 
uncontrollably in the near future seems to be gaining traction. 
Recently updated UN projections show that the African pop-
ulation is meant to double between 2010 and 2040, from 1 to 
2 billion people (i.e., four times the population of the EU28). 
These projections have fuelled fears of a potential “multipli-
er effect” that demographic growth could have on migration 
from Africa to Europe3. In this chapter, we set out to investigate 
whether these fears are grounded. We attempt to leverage data 
on half a century of migration from Africa to Europe to forecast 
what could happen in the future. We do so as we believe that an 
evidence-based projection of likely migration trends should be 
used to prepare for what the future holds, and to better inform 
planning and policy design in the EU and its Member States.
Like any forecasting exercise, this is no easy task. Forecasting 
future differences in migration stocks is particularly difficult as 
migration is conceptualised differently across countries, with 
data often incomplete and problematic. Furthermore, it is diffi-
cult to capture a comprehensive picture of all migration drivers4. 
Most demographic forecasting attempts thus treat migration as 
impossible to predict and, therefore, rely on scenarios that as-
sume migration settles at some constant level compared to his-
torical trends5. Of course, conflict-related migration and other 
forced movements are hardest to predict, and may warrant such 
a treatment. However, structural factors could help us predict the 
3 D. Scalea, Come l’immigrazione sta cambiando la demografia italiana (The way migration is 
changing Italian demography) Machiavelli Centro Studi Politici e Strategici, no. 2, 2017.
4 J. Bijak, “Migration forecasting: beyond the limits of  uncertainty”, International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) and Global Migration Data Analysis Centre 
(GMDAC) Data Briefing Series, no. 6, 2016.
5 For instance, “zero migration”, “historical migration” or “double historical mi-
gration”; see United Nations Department of  Economic and Social Affairs (UN 
DESA), World Population Prospects 2019, 2019, or W. Lutz et al. (eds.), Demographic 
and human capital scenarios in the 21st Century: 2018 Assessment for 201 Countries, 
European Commission, Joint Research Centre, 2018.
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intensity, direction, and timing of other migration movements.
In this chapter we delve deeper into a specific subset of mi-
gration flows, namely net emigration from African countries 
to the EU. By analyzing past trends, we find that many of the 
correlates that appear to drive bilateral migration at the global 
level do not seem to apply in this case. Instead of representing 
a problem, we turn the problem on its head, and attempt to 
forecast future flows directly. In an effort to be as fine-grained 
as possible, we provide country-specific forecasts of net emigra-
tion to the EU from 56 African countries and other territories 
identified by United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs (UN DESA) between 2020 and 2040.
We find that while future migration from the African con-
tinent to Europe should remain robust, it is not expected to 
reach unprecedented levels even as the African population dou-
bles. What is more, African migration to the EU is not even 
expected to rise linearly in tandem with the growth of African 
population, but to rather settle to pretty stable levels.
Our forecasts show that while migration from Africa to 
Europe will continue to pose a challenge to EU policy makers, 
this will not be an unprecedented challenge. As such, it will be 
crucial to prepare for potentially robust migration flows from 
the African continent, but this is a challenge that the EU as a 
whole can certainly manage.
Historical Trends of African Migration to Europe
In order to forecast future migration trends from Africa, we 
first need to understand what they look like today and how 
they have evolved in the recent past. To do so, we combine 
data on decadal migrant stocks between 1960 and 2000 from 
the World Bank6 with data on five-year migrant stocks between 
6 Ç.Özden, C.R. Parsons, M. Schiff, and T.L. Walmsley, “Where on Earth is 
Everybody? The Evolution of  Global Bilateral Migration 1960-2000”, The World 
Bank Economic Review, vol. 25, no. 1, 2011, pp. 12-56.
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1990 and 2019 from the UN7. For the time span where they 
overlap, the two datasets do not report the same levels of mi-
grant stocks. We merge them by calculating a country-specific 
multiplier that we then use to fit World Bank (WB) data to the 
UN’s. We calculate this multiplier as the ratio of migrant stocks 
reported by the UN in 1990 to the migrant stocks reported 
by the WB in the same year, for each African country. Finally, 
given that WB data is decadal, while UN data is provided on a 
five-year basis, we interpolate stock and population data for the 
years 1965, 1975 and 1985.
Today around 3.1% of Africans live abroad, compared to a 
world average of 3.5% international migrants per inhabitant. 
This share stands out as even smaller if compared with Europe, 
which is the first region in terms of how many of its citizens live 
abroad compared to its own population, with 8.2% of its popu-
lation living outside their country of birth, and Latin America, 
where 6.2% of the population has crossed an international bor-
der and now lives abroad. 
Figure 1.1 shows Africa’s international migrant stock as a 
share of the continent’s population, as it varies with time (dot-
ted line). If we separate sub-Saharan African (SSA) migrants 
from Northern African (NA) migrants, we notice that up to 
very recently the share of population living outside their coun-
try of birth followed two opposite trends8. Before 1970-1980, 
the share of sub-Saharan Africans abroad was actually greater 
than that of North Africans. However, over the years, whilst an 
increasing percentage of Northern Africans migrated, the share 
of SSA migrants slowly decreased and came to a stall. Since 
2010, this trend reverted, but there still remains a substantial 
difference between the percentage of NA and SSA migrants, as 
today the share of Northern Africans abroad is almost double 
that of sub-Saharan Africans.
7 UN DESA (2019).
8 Note that NA is comprised of  just five countries (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, 
Morocco, and Tunisia), with a population of  195 million in 2019, or just over 
15% of  the whole African continent.
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Fig. 1.1 - Stock of African emigrants / 
total population of origin
 
Source: authors’ elaborations on UN DESA and WB data
We now turn to African migration to the EU. To frame this 
focus, we take a step back to the 3.1% of Africans who have 
migrated and consider that approximately half of them have 
left the continent. Of those who have left the region, an even 
smaller percentage has reached the European Union: overall, 
today, only 26% of all African migrants are in the EU.
Even so, as Figure 1.2 shows, the stock of African migrants 
living in the EU in 2019 is almost ten times the stock of mi-
grants sixty years ago, in 1960. If we look back at the last thirty 
years, between 1990 and 2019, the number of African migrants 
in the EU has more than doubled, from 4.6 million to 10.3 
million. This increase concerns both migrants from SSA and 
those from NA countries. Given NA’s geographical proximity 
to EU countries, however, the share of migrants from this area 
living in the EU has constantly been higher than the share of 
SSA migrants. However, while in 1960 SSA migrants made up 
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only 22% of all Africans living in the EU; this share has slowly 
increased over time, reaching 36% in 1990 and 46% in 2019.
Notwithstanding the latest 2013-2017 “migration crisis”, 
Africans living in the EU still comprise only 2.0% of the bloc’s 
overall population. This share has indeed doubled from 1.0% 
in 1990, but mostly between the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
not today. Also interesting to note is that, while several EU 
countries have tightened regular channels for African migrants, 
migration from the continent has not abated, but has mostly 
shifted towards irregular routes9. This is evidence that under-
lying structural factors of migration tend to be stronger than 
policies aimed at restricting access, making flows hard to stop.
Fig. 1.2 - African migrants in the EU28
Source: authors’ elaborations on UN DESA and WB data
9 European Commission, Many more to come? Migration from and within Africa, Joint 
Research Centre, Luxembourg, Publications Office of  the European Union, 
2018; M. Barslund, M. Di Salvo, and L. Ludolph (2019).
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What Shapes African Migration to Europe
The observation that it is hard to “stop” migration, as African 
migration to the EU has mostly followed an upward trend ir-
respective of policies within the European continent, brings 
up the question of what are the structural drivers that actually 
shape migration from Africa to the EU. Below, we focus on 
net emigration, which implicitly accounts for return migration 
from the EU to African countries. Evidence shows that, apart 
from very few and recent cases such as the return of Angolan 
nationals, return migration from the EU to African countries 
has been minimal so far10.
Focusing on African net emigration to the EU has two ma-
jor benefits. First, it allows us to ignore movements within the 
African continent, insofar as they do not generate major move-
ments outside the continent. Migration within the African 
continent is much less predictable because it includes almost 
all continental forced migration. As is well known, forced mi-
grants overwhelmingly remain closer to their previous homes 
than international migrants. For instance, in 2018 two-thirds 
of forced migrants in the world had left their homes but not 
their country (they are internally displaced persons, or IDPs), 
while of those who did cross an international border, 85% had 
moved to neighbouring countries or other countries within the 
same region11. Forced migration is the least predictable of mi-
gration flows: both in time, as it is affected by sudden changes 
in political and social conditions in the countries of origin; and 
in intensity, as the number of forced migrants that eventually 
decide to cross an international border can depend on a large 
10 S. Migali, F. Natale, T. Tintori et al., International Migration Drivers: A Quantitative 
Assessment of  the Structural Factors Shaping Migration, Joint Research Centre, JRC 
Science for Policy Report, Luxembourg Publications Office of  the European 
Union, 2018.
11 UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, June 2019; S. Fransen and 
H. de Haas, The Volume and Geography of  Forced Migration, IMI Working Paper, no. 
156, 2019.
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number of factors in the country of origin that are difficult to 
measure (e.g., the precise places affected by conflict, the tar-
geted populations and their propensity to migrate, and the 
presence or absence of factors that make a person or group of 
persons involuntarily immobile). By focusing on African net 
emigration to Europe, much of the forced migration flows can 
be disregarded, making forecasts much more feasible.
Second, focusing on net emigration to the EU as a whole, 
rather than to each Member State, allows us to investigate the 
determinants of migration towards a macro-region, eliminat-
ing idiosyncrasies at the country level that might hide deeper 
trends, while adding precision to our forecasts (as we do not 
need to estimate the exact destination of African migrants with-
in Europe). Our focus on the whole of the EU also accounts for 
the high rate of (both regular and irregular) mobility of non-
EU nationals within the EU12. 
Our estimates of five-year migration flows are based on a 
simple subtraction between five-year stocks (i.e., stock differ-
encing). We are aware that there are other, more elaborate ways 
to estimate migration flows13: however, we rely on this raw 
measure as a first approximation on which other researchers 
may want to build upon in the future. There are a number of 
reasons why stock differencing might be both overestimating 
and underestimating net migration rates. It tends to overesti-
mate emigration: (1) because children born from foreigners in 
EU countries are counted as migrants from the origin country 
as long as they do not acquire the host country’s citizenship 
(which can take a considerable time, given that no EU country 
has a pure ius soli law); and (2) because it is blind to levels of 
return migration, which are negligible today, but can be ex-
pected to be higher in the future14.  It may also underestimate 
12 European Migration Network (EMN), Intra-EU Mobility of  Third Country 
Nationals, EMN Study, 2013; European Commission (2018).
13 (Abel 2019)
14 J.J. Azose and A.E. Raftery, “Estimation of  emigration, return migration, 
and transit migration between all pairs of  countries”, Proceedings of  the National 
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net African emigration to the EU: (1) when African nationals 
living in the EU acquire the citizenship of the host country / 
change citizenship within any five-year period; and (2) when 
African nationals living in the EU die. Despite these caveats, 
we think stock differencing offers a good approximation of net 
migration, and leave attempts at refining our estimates to fu-
ture research.
To investigate covariates of African migration to the EU, we 
start from the findings of classic gravitational models15. In par-
ticular, we want to check whether income levels, the presence of 
larger cohorts of young populations, the presence of diasporas 
in the destination region, or the end of the Cold War have had 
an effect on the likelihood of Africans to migrate to the EU. 
To do so, we first calculate net emigration rates (emigration 
flows per 1,000 inhabitants of the origin country at the start 
of the 5-year period), set all negative emigration rates at (very 
close to) zero and take the natural logarithm of the resulting 
variable16. We then rely on UN data for total population and 
age composition, and on WB data for average GDP per capita 
(at constant dollars). We estimate our regressions on 5-year data 
spanning more than five decades, from 1965 to 2019, for 53 
African countries17. Table 1.1 reports our results, according to 
three different model specifications. 
Academy of  Sciences (PNAS), vol. 116, no. 1, 2019, pp. 116-122.
15 European Commission (2018).
16 M. Beine, F. Docquier, Ç. Özden, “Diasporas”, Journal of  Development Economics, 
vol. 95, no. 1, 2011, pp. 30-41; and S. Bertoli, J. Fernández-Huertas Moraga, “The 
Size of  the Cliff  at the Border”, Regional Science and Urban Economics, vol. 51, pp. 
1-6. In our dataset, 8.2% of  all emigration rates from African countries to the 
EU are negative, 0.4% are already zeroes, and 91.4% are positive.
17 We use 2019 data to proxy for 2020, rebasing the change in net emigration 
stocks between 2015 and 2019 over five years instead of  four. Results do not 
change significantly if, instead of  using the logarithm of  emigration rates, we 
employ two different specifications for the dependent variable: (1) absolute em-
igration flows; (2) absolute emigration flows, but setting negative values to zero.
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Tab. 1.1 - Drivers of net emigration rates: 
Results of a multivariate panel regression
Model 1 shows the results of a classic multivariate linear regres-
sion. It recovers strong significance for both previous net emigra-
tion flows and the role of diasporas (“migrant stock / population”). 
It also recovers slight significance for economic development, al-
beit only in a linear way (the quadratic term is not significant). 
However, a correct estimation in a panel setting should always 
include fixed effects: by only looking at within-country variation, 
fixed effects models avoid misinterpreting those effects recovered 
at the “systemic” level that then disappear when looking at the 
country level (in other words, they prevent some ecological fal-
lacies). Moreover, fixed effects have the crucial additional benefit 
that they can account for factors that are known to drive migra-
tion but do not vary with time, such as geographical distance, 
former colonial ties, or a common language.
Models 2 and 3 report results after including fixed effects. 
As can be seen, very few covariates appear to drive net migra-
tion from African countries to the EU. First, strikingly, the 
role of diasporas in attracting further emigration from African 
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countries to the EU is reversed. This is all the more surprising, 
given that family reunification is one of the main channels al-
lowing for African migration to many EU countries. Second, 
even as past research has shown that the 15-34 year-old cohorts 
are more likely to migrate, changes in their importance relative 
to each African country’s total population between 1960 and 
today do not appear to have had a significant effect in driving 
migration from the continent to the EU.
Third, even the role of economic development appears to be 
muted. Past research has found that net emigration tends to fol-
low a “hump-shaped” curve as a country develops18: as a coun-
try moves up from low income levels, net emigration rates tend 
to increase as well – until the country’s GDP per capita at pur-
chasing power parity (PPP) reaches approximately 5,000 inter-
national dollars. Only after that threshold, as average incomes 
rise, the (net) number of people emigrating starts to fall, as peo-
ple are more capable to migrate but also less willing to do so. 
Given that the average GDP per capita of sub-Saharan African 
countries today is less than 4,000 international dollars at PPP, 
or well under the peak of the so-called “migration hump”, we 
should expect net emigration to increase as countries develop.
However, Model 3 shows that this does not appear to be the 
case for African migration into the EU over the past five dec-
ades: variation in economic development appears to have no 
significant effect on migration flows, and the non-significance 
of the quadratic term suggests there is no “humped” relation. In 
order to delve deeper into these results, we used our dataset to 
replicate the findings of past research19. When looking at all net 
emigration rates from all countries in the world, we manage to 
18 M.A. Clemens, Does Development Reduce Migration?, CGD Working Paper 359, 
Center for Global Development, Washington D.C., 18 March 2014; see also 
chapter 3 of  this Report.
19 We approximate the relationship between economic development and migra-
tion relying on period averages (1960-1970, 1970-1980, 1990-1995, 1995-2000, 
2000-2005, 2005-2010, 2010-2015) for population and GDP per capita (at con-
stant dollars).
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replicate the “migration hump”; however, when we restrict our 
analysis to the subset of sub-Saharan African countries, we find 
that the trend changes markedly20. Figure 1.3 does not show a 
“hump”, but what could be named a “migration plateau”: net 
emigration rates from every African country to all countries in 
the world do not exhibit the typical inverted-U shape, but rath-
er remain at similar rates at most levels of economic develop-
ment. Even when restricting our analysis to flows from Africa 
to the EU28, the shape of the curve remains more similar to a 
plateau than a hump21.
Fig. 1.3 -  Relationship between GDP per capita 
and net emigration rates
Source: authors’ elaborations on UN DESA and WB data. 
Solid lines represent moving averages (period 30).
20 Findings do not vary significantly over time: when computing seven separate 
moving averages for each time period, we obtain curves that are similar to those 
portrayed in Figure 1.3.
21 Even when looking at subsets for the various time periods, between 1960 and 
2015, the relationship between the level of  economic development and emigra-
tion rates from the African continent (to the world or to the EU) does not appear 
to change significantly over time.
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Going back to our models, we also do not find strong evidence 
of a rising trend in net emigration rates from Africa to the 
EU28 as time goes by: when testing for a post-Cold War effect 
(on flows from 1990-1995 onwards), only Model 2 recovers 
a significant effect. On the opposite, yearly controls recover a 
significant acceleration during the 2000-2005 period, which 
dampens in 2005-2015, and then picks up again in the final 
period of our series (2015-2019).
Most importantly, our models appear to show that a strongly 
significant predictor of future net emigration of Africans to the 
EU28 is past net emigration. It should then be possible to fore-
cast future African migration into the EU without having to 
account for the future evolution of many classic covariates, but 
by only looking at past emigration rates. However, as the role 
of diasporas appears to have an unexpected moderating effect 
on future flows, forecasts based only on past emigration flows 
could overestimate future flows as the diasporas in Europe grow.
There might be an even better alternative. The strong auto-
correlation in time of emigration flows recovered by our models 
urges us to look at stocks directly (or better, at the share of mi-
grant stocks over the total population of a country). Clearly, if 
past emigration from African countries to the EU strongly pre-
dicts current emigration, then trends in migrants stocks should 
be even more closely related, and thus easier to forecast. This 
appears to be the case: by inspecting the evolution in the stocks 
of African migrants living in the EU, we find that they exhibit 
a very high degree of stability, with a 0.97 correlation between 
migrant stocks and their 5-year lags22.
A potential worry could be based on the fact that, as the 
African population is set to double between 2010 and 2040 
from 1 to 2 billion people, even a very resilient trend in the re-
cent past could not help us forecast future flows. However, such 
worries should be assuaged precisely in light of past evidence. 
22 Pearson’s correlation coefficient varies between -1 (perfect negative correla-
tion) and 1 (perfect positive correlation).
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The African population has already doubled twice between the 
1950s and today, moving from less than 250 million to over 
500 million (1950-1985), and then doubling again to 1 billion 
by 2010. Yet, the ratio of migrant stocks over the population 
has followed a much steadier, and thus more predictable trend. 
Take Nigeria: just like the overall African trend, the country’s 
population has doubled twice, from 45 million in 1960 to over 
100 million in 1995, and then to 200 million in 2019. Yet, 
Figure 1.4 shows that the migrant stock ratio has followed a 
highly predictable trend.
Fig. 1.4 - Nigeria: total population and migrant stock ratio 
to the EU28
Source: authors’ elaborations on UN DESA and WB data
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What the Future Holds: Forecasting Emigration 
from Africa to the EU
In the previous section, we established that net emigration rates 
from African countries are not significantly correlated with 
most of their classic determinants23. To forecast future African 
migration to the EU, we therefore directly rely on the evolu-
tions in the ratio between the stocks of African emigrants to EU 
countries and the total population of each African country at 
the start of each 5-year period, between 1960 and 2019.
Our sample is composed of 56 of the 58 African countries 
and other territories identified by UN DESA, leaving aside only 
those for which data on migrant stocks is missing (i.e., South 
Sudan and Mayotte). We forecast the share of future migration 
stocks both to the EU28 and to the EU27 (all Member States 
minus the United Kingdom)24. We then rely on the low, medi-
um, and high variants of population projections produced by 
UN DESA (2019) to calculate the absolute stock of African 
citizens living in the EU between 2025 and 2040. Finally, we 
estimate future net emigration flows via stock differencing (see 
above).
To obtain our forecasts of the share of future migration 
stocks of African citizens living in EU countries we estimate 
univariate, country-specific ARIMA (autoregressive integrated 
moving average) models. In order to choose between different 
23 Recall that, differently from classic findings of  determinants of  net emigration 
(which generally look at all or most countries in the world), the estimated role 
of  the presence of  diasporas in the EU28 in determining future emigration rates 
from African countries is significantly negative. This means that our forecasts 
will likely be an overestimate of  actual future realisations. In other words, emi-
gration from Africa could be expected to be somewhat lower in the future than 
what our forecasts predict.
24 Clearly, EU27 forecasts do not take into account the effect that the UK not 
being a member of  the EU would have on the propensity to migrate to the EU. 
Similarly, also past migration trends used to compute migration forecasts do not 
consider the effect of  the UK not being an EU member on the propensity to 
migrate.
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specifications of the ARIMA models, we rely on the methods 
proposed by Hyndman and Athanasopoulos (2018)25. We then 
inspect the forecasts manually and correct for a few notable 
countries for which the selected forecasting method returns 
clearly unreasonable results. Namely, we correct for four out of 
56 African countries in the EU27 forecast (Djibouti, Eritrea, 
Morocco and Tunisia) and for six countries in the EU28 fore-
cast (the previous four, plus Somalia and Zimbabwe)26.
Figure 1.5 reports the result of our forecasts. As shown, em-
igration from Africa to the EU28 is expected to remain robust, 
but not increase to unprecedented levels. Indeed, while Africa’s 
population is meant to double between 2010 and 2040, migra-
tion flows from Africa to the EU are expected to stabilise, re-
maining well within the range of past fluctuations. Specifically, 
25 More precisely, we use the “auto.arima” function included in the “forecast” 
package developed for R, in its latest version released on 5 December 2019. 
Essentially, the methods choose an ARIMA (p,q,s) specification by minimis-
ing the corrected Akaike Information Criterion (AICc), which corrects for 
small-sample bias. R.J. Hyndman and G. Athanasopoulos, Forecasting: principles and 
practice, 2nd edition, OTexts, Melbourne, Australia, 2018.
26 In the case of  forecasts to the EU27, corrections are as follow. (1) Djibouti. 
The model forecasts a constantly declining stock of  emigrants over the country’s 
population, from 0.7% in 2025 to 0.2% in 2040. We impute the last known value 
in 2019, i.e. 1.0%, to the whole forecast window; (2) Eritrea. The model sees the 
ratio of  the stock to the population rising from 4.1% in 2019 to 13.0% in 2040. 
This is clearly implausible, as the forecast is strongly affected by a rise in forced 
migrants that reached the EU in 2015-2020. Therefore, we impute the first point 
forecast for 2025 (6.3%) to all remaining five-year periods. This is still a sub-
stantial rise from the abovementioned value of  4.1% in 2019; (3) Morocco. The 
model forecasts a constant rise, from 7.5% in 2019 to 9.5% in 2040. This runs 
counter to the considerable stability in the series between 2005 (7.1%) and 2019 
(7.5%). Therefore, we impute the peak levels reached in 2010 (i.e. 7.8%) to the 
whole forecast window; (4) Tunisia. Opposite from Morocco, the model expects 
Tunisian emigrant stock/population ratio to shrink from 5.3% in 2019 to 4.8% 
in 2040. We consider this to be a reversal that is not supported by trends in the 
past fifteen years (from 5.0% in 2005 to 5.3% in 2019) and therefore impute the 
last value of  5.3% to the remainder of  the series. Despite all corrections, we pre-
serve the recovered uncertainty around these estimates in order to incorporate 
it in our forecasts.
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our forecasts expect that between 220,000 and 300,000 Africans 
will reach the EU28 every year between 2020 and 2040, with 
a central forecast of 260,000 persons. Of these, 200,000 per 
year are expected to reach EU27 countries, with the remainder 
going to the UK.
Fig. 1.5 - Past realisations and forecasts of net yearly 
emigration from Africa
 
Source: authors’ elaborations and forecasts on UN DESA and WB data
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Cumulatively, this means that the number of African citizens 
living in the EU28 (and who have not acquired EU citizenship) 
is expected to increase from 10.3 million in 2019 to between 
14.9 and 16.6 million by 2040. Compared to the total EU28 
population, which the UN estimates at 513 million in 2019, 
very slowly declining to 507 million in 2040, this is equivalent 
to a rise from 2% today to between 2.9% and 3.3% by 2040, 
with a central estimate of 3.1%.
Despite evidence that the shifting age composition of Africans 
did not significantly affect net emigration from the continent 
to the EU in the past, it could be interesting to see whether our 
univariate models pick up any difference for the near future. We 
therefore re-estimated our forecasts by employing the stock of 
emigrants over the share of population in each African country 
aged between 15 and 34 years, which according to research is 
the set of demographic cohorts most likely to migrate27. Figure 
1.6 shows five-year migration flows to the EU27, reporting our 
central forecasts and the aggregate of country-specific forecasts 
with data on the population aged 15-34. Migration estimates 
differ more prominently in the first decade after 2020, and then 
converge towards 200,000 per year by 2040. Overall, yearly 
migration is forecast to be slightly lower at around 190,000, 
compared to around 210,000 when using total population.
If we break down our results between NA and SSA countries, 
we notice that the regional composition of migration flows 
to the EU is expected to change as well. Compared with the 
recent past, we expect the increasing role of the sub-Saharan 
African (SSA) component to expand over time compared to 
the Northern African (NA) one. While, as recalled above, NA 
is comprised of just five countries making up just over 15% of 
the whole African population in 2019, between 1975 and 2005 
total emigration to Europe averaged around 75,000 per year 
from both NA and SSA regions. This shows the importance of 
geographic distance to determine migration flows.
27 European Commission (2018).
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Fig. 1.6 - Comparison of forecasts of migration to the EU27, 
using total population or cohorts aged 15-34
Source: authors’ elaborations and forecasts on UN DESA and WB data
From 2005-2010 onwards, migration flows to the EU included 
more SSA migrants than NA migrants, the former making up 
around 60% of total flows. Our forecasts expect this share to 
increase over the next two decades, reaching 77% of flows from 
Africa in 2040. This will slowly affect the composition in the 
stock of African citizens living in the EU28 (see Figure 1.7): in 
1975, around 70% of Africans living in EU28 countries came 
from the five Northern African countries. By 2020, this share 
had already shrunk to 54%. Our central forecast expects SSA 
emigrants to overtake NA ones by 2030, and to climb to 55% 
of the total by 2040.
Finally, the fact that we employ country-specific forecasts al-
lows us to rank countries by expected yearly migration flows to 
the EU27 over the next two decades. Figure 1.8 shows both our 
forecast’s central estimate, which builds upon the total popula-
tion of each country, and the estimate that relies on the share of 
population aged 15-34. 
What the Future Holds: Migration from Africa to the EU 31
Fig. 1.7 - Regional composition of the total African 
population living in the EU28
Source: authors’ elaborations and forecasts on UN DESA and WB data
 
The first thing to note is that our central forecast expects 
Morocco and Algeria to remain the top senders of migrants 
from Africa to the EU27 over the next twenty years, followed 
by Senegal, Nigeria, and Somalia. According to UN projec-
tions, in 2040 Nigeria will be the most populous African coun-
try by far: its population (329 million inhabitants) could be 
more than twice that of the second most populous country, 
Ethiopia (175 million). And yet, in terms of migration to the 
EU, Nigeria is expected to be only in fourth place. The reason 
for this is, simply put, that the citizens of some countries have 
a higher likelihood to migrate than others, and Nigerians and 
Ethiopians have a markedly lower tendency to leave their coun-
tries than, say, Algerians or Gambians.
Worth noting is the huge variability in the forecasts of mi-
gration from Morocco to the EU27 when we employ the two 
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different methods. This is very different from all other African 
countries, for which central estimates remain remarkably stable 
(at least in absolute terms). The reason for this is that Morocco’s 
is one of the few populations in Africa whose demographic co-
horts between 15 and 34 years old are poised not to increase 
markedly over the forecast window, stabilising at around 12 mil-
lion people in 2040 versus 11.6 million today. It remains to be 
seen whether this will bring about a slowdown in net emigration 
to the EU, as expected from migration models based on all the 
world’s countries, or whether Morocco will remain in line with 
other African countries, with shifts in age composition having 
little to no significant impact on future migration flows.
Fig. 1.8 - Country-level forecasts of net emigration to EU28
Source: authors’ elaborations and forecasts on UN DESA and WB data
We do not regard these country-specific forecasts to be as ro-
bust as those referring to the entire African continent, and 
therefore we expect them to need more frequent revisions over 
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the coming years. Nonetheless, they may serve as a good ref-
erence point for EU and African policy makers. In particular, 
they show which country or sets of countries should be expect-
ed to contribute the most to net emigration flows towards the 
EU over the next two decades, allowing for better targeting of 
migration-related policies by all stakeholders involved.
Conclusion
Recent attempts at bringing down seaborne irregular migration 
to Europe have proved very effective. But these reductions have 
been achieved through disputable bilateral deals that “external-
ised” migration control to transit countries. Additionally, their 
practical sustainability over the longer term is questionable, es-
pecially if the incentives to migrate remain as structurally lop-
sided as they have been in the past few decades.
In this chapter, we have shown that the belief that demo-
graphic pressures will make migration from Africa to Europe 
impossible to manage are highly exaggerated. Our forecasts 
show that, while migration from Africa to Europe will contin-
ue to pose a challenge to EU policy makers, this will not be 
an unprecedented challenge. As such, it will be crucial to pre-
pare for potentially robust migration flows from the African 
continent, but this is a challenge that the EU as a whole can 
certainly manage, especially if Member States plan in advance, 
show solidarity with each other, and work towards an improved 
international migration governance system.
We expect net migration flows from Africa to Europe to set-
tle at more than double the 1960-2000 yearly average (+116%), 
but to increase by just 7% compared to 2000-2020. This is ev-
idence that the trend had already changed markedly in the past 
two decades, and is not expected to increase disproportionately 
in the near future. More in detail, we foresee net emigration 
from Africa to Europe to stabilize at around 260,000 per year 
between 2020 and 2040. Cumulatively, this means that the 
number of African citizens living in the EU28 should increase 
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from 10.3 million in 2019 to between 14.9 and 16.6 million by 
2040. Relative to the EU28 population, this is equivalent to a 
rise from 2% today to between 2.9% and 3.3% by 2040 (with 
a central estimate of 3.1%).
In addition to contributing to assuage fears, improved 
modelling of expected migration flows from specific African 
countries can inform current and future action by EU policy 
makers. Knowing with a sufficient degree of precision which 
African countries will account for the largest share of future 
migration flows to Europe over the next two decades could al-
low better targeting of development assistance and diplomatic 
engagement.
Our findings point to the need to acknowledge that the pol-
icy toolbox available to European policymakers might be more 
limited than currently believed. For instance, the “migration 
plateau” suggests that emigration from African countries will 
not change much even as they develop economically. At the 
same time, as African economies continue to grow, the extent 
to which the EU can effectively rely on carrot-and-stick policies 
to induce cooperation from reluctant partners will be increas-
ingly limited, as every euro spent in the continent will be worth 
incrementally less.
On the other hand, many other policy tools remain avail-
able to better manage future migration flows. Tailoring legal 
migration channels (especially for labour migrants) to expected 
migration flows from specific countries can help the EU avoid 
the human suffering and economic losses caused by forcing mi-
grants to move through irregular channels instead. Enhanced 
regular channels could be combined more strongly with pro-
grammes to educate and train potential migrants who are still 
in origin countries, bringing down costs while bolstering their 
chances to integrate once in Europe. Finally, investing in inte-
gration policies that are suitable for those who are expected to 
reach Europe in the near future can also help to cut costs and 
to focus on those policies that actually work, such as language 
courses, or vocational training in specific sectors.
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In conclusion, forecasting future migration flows is crucial 
for moving towards an approach to migration governance that 
is led by pragmatism, rather than baseless fears and false myths. 
Some Africans will migrate to Europe no matter what. Whether 
everyone can make the most out of it will depend on how gov-
ernments choose to face this inevitable phenomenon.
2.  Migration, Development 
     and the 2030 Agenda1
Marta Foresti, Jessica Hagen-Zanker, 
Helen Dempster, Christopher Smart 
Migration is one of the defining features of the XXI century. 
While people have always moved and always will, there is no 
doubt that the so-called “crisis” of 2015 has brought migration 
to the attention of the international community, and there is 
no doubt that migration is now a major political priority in 
different countries. Importantly, while much attention is paid 
to the increasing flows between low-income and high-income 
countries, for example between Africa and Europe or between 
South/Central and North America, most migrants move either 
within countries or between neighbouring countries. In other 
words, migration is mainly a regional phenomenon that affects 
rich and poor countries alike. 
International migration poses both challenges and opportu-
nities for the achievement of economic and social development 
everywhere. While the level of economic growth, development 
opportunities, security and political instability can be drivers 
of migration from some countries, migration journeys are like-
ly to be affected by key challenges facing nations and peoples 
everywhere, such as resource scarcity and climate breakdown, 
1 This new chapter builds on a series of  briefings on Migration and the 2030 
Agenda created by the Overseas Development Institute between 2016 and 2018. 
Full details of  the original series can be found in the bibliography and all are 
available on the ODI website.
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gender and wealth inequality, quality livelihoods, the eradica-
tion of poverty, and the right to healthy and fulfilling lives in 
sustainable societies. 
This chapter will address the interaction of migration and 
the 2030 Agenda, its implications for development in different 
countries, and the key policy areas related to the 2030 Agenda 
which will affect the future of migration to Europe. It will draw 
out key questions and themes and indicate areas for policy re-
sponses which will play a role in migration trends to Europe in 
coming decades and surmise their implications on the future 
form and intensity of migration to Europe in the context of the 
Sustainable Development Goals. 
Migration and the 2030 Agenda 
Migration contributes significantly to all aspects of economic 
and social development everywhere, and as such will be key to 
achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Although 
the relationship between migration and development is increas-
ingly recognised, it remains underexplored. We know that a lack 
of opportunities and investment in origin countries can drive 
migration. But we also know that migration can improve de-
velopment and investment in origin countries, fill labour gaps 
and foster innovation in host countries, and can contribute to 
development along the journey (or, in “transit countries”). It is 
an effective poverty reduction tool – not just for migrants them-
selves, but also for their families and their wider communities.
Migration can contribute to positive development outcomes 
and, ultimately, to realising the goals of the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development (the “2030 Agenda”). To do this, we 
need to understand the impact of migration on the achievement 
of all SDGs, and – equally – the impact this achievement will have 
on future migration patterns. As Member States and International 
Institutions are starting to discuss how to implement the Global 
Compact for Migration (GCM), it is more important than ever 
to understand these links and their implications for policy.
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The 2030 Agenda is well placed to reflect and exploit the 
links between migration and development for three reasons. 
First, the 2030 Agenda is the first international development 
framework to include and recognise migration as a dimension 
of development. The Agenda includes migration-related tar-
gets and recognises its important contribution to sustainable 
development, while acknowledging the specific vulnerabilities 
migrants may face2. 
Second, migration interacts with all dimensions of develop-
ment. The multi-disciplinary and cross-sectoral nature of the 
2030 Agenda is a useful platform to assess the impact of mi-
gration and human mobility on a range of development issues3. 
This is not just important in terms of problem analysis but also 
offers opportunities for finding policy solutions. 
Finally, and crucially, the 2030 Agenda is supported by the 
necessary political “traction” in different Member States and in 
the multilateral system. The impacts of migration can be felt at 
all stages of the journey – notably in both origin and host coun-
tries – and as such it interacts with different sectors, requiring 
coordination between multiple actors and enhanced coherence 
across policies. This kind of coordination is only possible with 
high-level buy-in, something the SDGs have already secured. 
Furthermore, the SDGs’ multi-disciplinary nature increases the 
potential for multi-stakeholder collaboration4.
The 2030 Agenda includes a number of targets which rec-
ognise the economic value of migrants including SDGs 4, 5, 
8, 10, 16 and 17 (Table 2.1). In particular, target 10.7 – the 
cornerstone of migration in the 2030 Agenda – calls for the 
2 United Nations (UN), Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development, New York, 2015.
3 L. Lönnback, Integrating migration into the post-2015 United Nations Development 
Agenda, Bangkok and Washington D.C., International Organization for Migration 
and Migration Policy Institute, September 2014.
4 E. Mosler Vidal, “The Sustainable Development Goals and labour mobility: a 
case study of  Armenia”, in G. Appave and N. Sinha (eds.) Migration in the 2030 
Agenda, Geneva, International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2017, pp. 72-84.
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facilitation of “safe, regular and responsible migration” and the 
implementation of “well-managed migration policies”. 
Outside these targets, however, the Agenda is silent on the 
broader contribution of migration to development outcomes. 
These omitted and ‘indirect’ links between migration and de-
velopment are the focus of our work. If countries are to achieve 
the SDGs, they need to consider the impact of migration at all 
levels and on all outcomes, beyond the targets in “ to be solved 
(as is the subtext of SDG 10.7), but a mechanism or a strategy 
that can contribute to the achievement of many of the goals5. 
To do this, governments and other actors need to identify the 
multiple linkages between migration and different goals and 
targets (Table 2), while at the same time also recognising that 
migrants can also be vulnerable and should be considered un-
der the general principle of “leaving no one behind”.
Tab. 2.1 - The targets that mention migration (UN 2015)
4.b
By 2020, substantially expand globally the number of scholarships 
available to developing countries in particular LDCs, SIDS and 
African countries, for enrolment in higher education, including 
vocational training and ICT, technical, engineering and scientific 
programmes in developed countries and other developing countries
5.2
Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls
in the public and private spheres, including trafficking
and sexual and other types of exploitation
8.7
Take immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced labour,
end modern slavery and human trafficking and secure the prohibition
and elimination of the worst forms of child labour, including 
recruitment and use of child soldiers, and by 2025 end child labour 
in all its forms
8.8
Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working
environments for all workers, including migrant workers,
in particular women migrants, and those in precarious employment
5 M. Foresti and J. Hagen-Zanker, Migration and development: How human mobility can 
help achieve the sustainable development goals, ODI Briefing Note, London, Overseas 
Development Institute (ODI), 2018.
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10.7
Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and
mobility of people, including through the implementation
of planned and well-managed migration policies
10.c
By 2030, reduce to less than 3% the transaction costs of migrant 
remittances and eliminate remittance corridors
with costs higher than 5%
16.2 End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children
17.18
By 2020, enhance capacity building support to developing 
countries,
including for Least Developed Countries (LCDs) and
Small Island Developing States (SIDS), to increase significantly
the availability of high-quality, timely and reliable data
disaggregated by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory
status, disability, geographic location and other characteristics
relevant in national contexts
Poverty Reduction and Migration 
in the 2030 Agenda 
Migration is a powerful poverty reduction tool, which can con-
tribute to the achievement of all SDGs.
Labour migration can reduce poverty for migrants them-
selves, their families, and their origin and host countries. 
Migrants and their families benefit from increased income and 
knowledge, which allows them to spend more on basic needs, 
more reliable and modern energy services, access education and 
health services, and make investments (SDGs 1, 3, 4 and 7). 
For female migrants, increased economic resources can improve 
their autonomy and socioeconomic status (SDG 5). In origin 
countries, migration can lead to increased wages and greater 
economic growth through higher incomes, spending, knowl-
edge and technology transfers, and investments of migrant 
households (SDGs 8 and 9). In host countries, migrants can 
fill labour gaps, contribute to services, and increase government 
budget through taxes and social security contributions (SDGs 
1, 8 and 9). 
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However, migration does not always achieve its full potential. 
Our analysis on migration and sustainable cities finds that poor 
urban migrants often work in the informal sector where the re-
wards of migration are lower6. Likewise, the ability of low- and 
semi-skilled labour migrants to access decent work is highly 
constrained7. In relation to poverty, our research reveals that the 
high costs involved in different stages of the migration process 
6 P. Lucci, D. Mansour-Ille, E. Easton-Calabria, and C. Cummings, Sustainable 
cities: internal migration, jobs and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, ODI 
Briefing Note, London, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), 2016.
7 R. Mallett, Decent work, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 
ODI Briefing Note, London, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), 2018.
CASE STUDY: THE NEW ZEALAND RECOGNISED 
SEASONAL EMPLOYER SCHEME*
The Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) programme began in 2007, aim-
ing to ease labour shortages in New Zealand’s horticulture and viticulture 
industries by admitting up to 5,000 seasonal workers (in the first instance), 
giving preference to those from Pacific countries. Promoting development in 
the Pacific Islands is an explicit goal of RSE. It is considered a success; a rigor-
ous multi-year evaluation showed it had a significant and multidimensional 
impact on poverty reduction for participating migrants and their households 
in Tonga and Vanuatu. In both countries, per-capita income of households 
with an RSE migrant rose by over 30% relative to non-migrant households, 
and in Tonga, households doubled their savings. Over two years, households 
in Vanuatu who reported having a bank account rose from 55% to 74% 
(ibid.), which is thought to reflect more formal savings practices. Subjective 
economic welfare increased significantly for households in both countries. 
Participating households in both countries purchased more durable assets, 
and in Tonga they were almost twice as likely as non-RSE households to make 
a home improvement. Moreover, school attendance rates increased by 20% 
for 16- to18-year-olds in Tonga**.
* J. Hagen-Zanker, H. Postel, and E. Mosler Vidal, Poverty, migration and the 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, ODI Briefing Note, London, Overseas 
Development Institute (ODI), 2017.
** Ibid.
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reduce financial payoffs, and that restrictions on mobility pre-
vent those who would benefit the most from migrating in a reg-
ular and orderly way8. More predictable, inclusive, and orderly 
migration processes would allow migrants, their families, and 
host areas to better reap the benefits of migration. A key ex-
ample of how migration can be engaged to reduce poverty can 
be seen in New Zealand’s recognised seasonal employer pro-
gramme identified in the ODI paper “Poverty migration and 
the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development” and reproduced 
with permission below.
Jobs, Stable Livelihoods, and Migration 
in the 2030 Agenda
The desire for decent work is likely to underpin much of the 
future migration trends to Europe as the share of informal 
and vulnerable employment continues to grow in low-income 
countries, where it dwarfs unemployment. ILO (International 
Labour Organization) figures suggest that the number of those 
who work in “vulnerable employment” excees unemployment 
by some margin9. Vulnerable employment here refers to high 
levels of precariousness in work, a greater likelihood of infor-
mal employment and a lower likelihood of job security, social 
protections or regular incomes10. In 2017 the number of people 
in these categories was estimated at 1.4 billion, with a further 
growth of 17 million in 201811. Around 300 million globally 
are working in extreme poverty and living on less that US$1.90 
per day (ibid). The desire for decent work is likely to shape much 
of the migration to richer countries. Figure 2.1 demonstrates 
8 J. Hagen-Zanker, H. Postel, and E. Mosler Vidal, Poverty, migration and the 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, ODI Briefing Note, London, Overseas 
Development Institute (ODI), 2017.
9 ILO, World employment and social outlook: trends 2018, Geneva, International 
Labour Organization (ILO), 2018
10 Ibid.  
11 R. Mallett (2018).
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the scale of vulnerable employment globally, a share that is 
likely to drive people to seek decent work through migration, 
often to high income countries. The dual role of push factors 
including insecure livelihoods and poverty and the interaction 
of pull factors of higher wages, and real or imagined better so-
cial protections  are key to driving migration for decent work12. 
“Transit countries” hosting migrants who are still looking to 
move elsewhere have the opportunity to engage migrant popu-
lations in work and boost their own development, as has been 
seen in the case of the Jordanian and Ethiopian compact ap-
proach to refugee employment13.
Fig 2.1 - Share of the global labour supply in paid employment, 
vulnerable employment and unemployment
Source: R. Mallett, Decent work, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development, ODI Briefing Note, 2018
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
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Education, Health and Migration 
in the 2030 Agenda 
Migrants contribute to better service provision and make vi-
tal contributions to host countries as workers and consumers. 
These potential benefits are stifled when access to basic services 
is denied or limited, undercutting the potential positive bene-
fits of migrant contributions. 
Granting access to healthcare and health services is crucial 
to ensure the health of migrants and their contributions as 
workers. But it also has important benefits for the general pop-
ulation in host countries. For instance, the entire population 
benefits from a reduced risk of communicable diseases when 
migrant children are vaccinated. Importantly, migrants often 
directly contribute to providing health and care services, which 
in many countries are increasingly reliable on migrant labour14. 
This also concerns social protection, where migrants can make 
important contributions to the fiscal balance of host countries, 
as the contributions they make in terms of taxes and other pay-
ments outweigh the benefits and services they receive15. 
Yet, granting migrants access to such services is not with-
out challenges – particularly when migration is unexpected or 
not accounted for. Large and unexpected migration flows can 
disrupt education systems, disadvantage migrant and refugee 
children, and create tensions in host communities16.
Importantly, the challenges to overcoming barriers to mi-
grants’ access to basic services are not technical and often not 
14 T. O’Neil, A. Fleury, and M. Foresti, Women on the move: migration, gender equal-
ity and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, ODI Briefing Note. London, 
Overseas Development Institute (ODI), 2016; O. Tulloch, F. Machingura, and 
C. Melamed, Health, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, ODI 
Briefing Note, London, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), 2016.
15 M. Foresti and J. Hagen-Zanker (2018).
16 S. Nicolai, J. Wales, and E. Aiazzi, Education, migration and the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development, ODI Briefing Note, London, Overseas Development 
Institute (ODI), 2017.
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even financial: for instance, the challenge in extending wa-
ter and sanitation access to migrants is often one of effective 
governance17. 
SDG 4 on education (see Table 2.2) is key to managing 
migration by offering opportunities in sending countries and 
contributing to development outcomes through training and 
learning for migrants who are then better able to contribute 
to societies they move to. Research demonstrates that levels of 
education contribute to more stable and democratic societies18 
and that investment in this area produces strong returns for 
countries19. Large immigration flows can have negative impli-
cations on education systems if they are overloaded suddenly, 
as seen in Jordan and Lebanon. where overcrowding as a re-
sult of rapid refugee influxes put a strain on school systems20. 
However, when managed well migration can have a positive 
impact on education by revitalising schools with low popula-
tions, and is linked in some instances with improvements in 
student performance21. The importance of quality education is 
crucial for integration and the building of societies enriched by 
migration and also crucial for development outcomes. Figure 
2.2 shows how quality education for second-generation mi-
grants can expand the speaking levels of destination country 
languages and in doing so, contribute more to the development 
outcomes of both migrants and countries through education. 
17 Ibid
18 UNESCO, Education for people and planet: creating sustainable futures for all, Global 
Education Monitoring Report, 2016.
19 S. Nicolai et al. (2017).
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
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Fig. 2.2 - Percentage of immigrant students who do not speak 
the language of assessment at home
Source: S. Nicolai, J. Wales  and E. Aiazzi, Education, migration and the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development. ODI Briefing Note, 2017
Education, providing lifelong learning for all (SDG4), is cru-
cial to engaging migrant populations and enabling them to live 
fulfilling and productive lives. Ensuring that people are able to 
access the education they need and are not forced to migrate 
as a result of a lack of opportunities is also crucial for develop-
ment outcomes. By providing them with access to education and 
training, migrants and their children will be better equipped to 
help fill labour market needs, increasing their local market con-
tribution, their earning potential, and the remittances they send 
home. More broadly, access to education helps achieve economic 
and social benefits such as improved livelihoods, better health 
outcomes, reductions in gender inequities, and enhanced polit-
ical participation, helping to achieve a broad range of SDGs22.
22 Long et al., 2017; S. Nicolai et al. (2017).
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Water, Energy, and Migration in the 2030 Agenda 
Access to fundamental services such energy and water might 
not be primary reasons for migration, but lack of access to ei-
ther is likely to worsen livelihoods, creating regional disparities 
that can lead to greater migration from low-access areas and 
countries to those which have better and reliable access to these 
services. 
Lack of access to water and sanitation is not always a driver 
of migration, but the provision of these services can support 
safe and successful migration. However, the barriers migrants 
face to access them will make achieving the SDGs more chal-
lenging23. SDG 6; to “ensure availability and sustainable man-
agement of water and sanitation for all” (see Table 2.2), is par-
ticularly difficult to address for populations in transit and for 
people with insecure immigration status whose access to these 
services might be curtailed as a result24. Access to water and 
sanitation might be factors in decisions to migrate, but com-
mon assumptions about lack of water being a major push factor 
are not always accurate25. Lack of access to water is perhaps as 
likely to initiate a shift in economic activities, away from water 
intensive agriculture to service work, as it might be to induce 
migration26. While there are instances where migration might 
be an adaptive strategy in the face of declining water supply or 
poor sanitation, the role of water is likely to be an indirect fac-
tor that is difficult to tease apart from other factors such as land 
degradation or declining economic opportunities27. 
23 G. Jobbins, I. Langdown, and G. Bernard, Water and sanitation, migration and the 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, ODI Briefing Note, London, Overseas 
Development Institute (ODI), 2018.
24 Ibid.
25 E. Wilkinson, L. Schipper, C. Simonet, and Z. Kubik, Climate change, migra-
tion and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, ODI Briefing Note, London, 
Overseas Development Institute (ODI), 2016.
26 G. Jobbins et al. (2018).
27 R. Reuveny, “Climate change-induced migration and violent conflict”, Political 
Geography, vol. 26, no. 6, 2007, pp. 656-673.
The Future of Migration to Europe48
Access to energy is a fundamental prerequisite for develop-
ment, and good livelihoods and strong development rely upon 
a reliable energy supply28. Not only is it essential in the provi-
sion of food, sanitation and quality of life, but it also allows for 
the provision of services that contribute to social and econom-
ic development29. SDG7 aims to ensure access to affordable 
and reliable energy for all (see Table 2.2) but the majority of 
those currently without access live in rural areas in sub-Saharan 
Africa and South Asia. Energy access has considerable impact 
on livelihoods, and decisions to migrate for a better future are 
likely to be influenced in part by access to energy in sending 
versus destination regions. Figure 2.3 shows the disparity in ac-
cess to electricity in destination versus sending countries. The 
difference is evidence of a level of high quality livelihoods and 
access to consumption needs and opportunities for productive 
activities in destination countries, which act as a driver of mi-
gration; these factors are reliant upon access to good quality 
energy. Though it might not be the case that low energy access 
is a primary factor in migration decisions, lower access to the 
opportunities offered by secure and reliable energy can often be 
a contributing factor. 
28 A. Scott, L. Worrall, and S. Pickard, Energy, migration and the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development, ODI Briefing Note, London, Overseas Development 
Institute (ODI), 2018.
29 Ibid.
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Fig. 2.3 - Distribution of migrants by level of education
Source: A. Scott, L. Worrall, and S. Pickard, Energy, migration and the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development, ODI Briefing Note, 2018
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Climate Change, Migration and the 2030 Agenda
Climate change is likely to affect regions such as Africa and 
the MENA countries negatively, putting pressure on resources, 
agricultural production and water supplies as well as creating 
higher levels of insecurity and potential conflict. While there is 
no universal definition of climate-induced migration, this con-
cept was sketched out by Wilkinson et al., (2016)30. Disaster-
induced migration has been a long-term issue particularly with-
in countries; between 2008 and 2015, 25.4 million people per 
year on average were displaced by disasters within and across 
borders; 85% of these disasters were climate induced31. Perhaps 
of more significance to the future of migration to Europe are 
the long-term changes to climate in regions and the instability 
this will bring. As short-term climate-induced migration be-
comes more common and contributes to long-term changes to 
the climate of regions, areas of the global south – particularly 
in Africa and the MENA countries – will become increasingly 
inhospitable, reducing quality of life and affecting migration 
choices32. In the even longer term, existential threats to com-
munities like sea level rise will contribute to the eradication of 
coastal communities and low-lying areas. Importantly, much of 
the world’s most fertile arable land is concentrated in low-ly-
ing areas, placing further long-term risks to food supplies. The 
many impacts of climate change at various time scales makes 
climate-induced migration hard to define and to identify, as 
migration might be forced by a disaster or be chosen as a sur-
vival strategy in the face of more gradual climate change33. The 
result of these changes will mean high levels of displacement34, 
30 E. Wilkinson et al. (2016).
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 E. Wilkinson et al. (2016).
34 A. Milan, G. Gioli, and T. Afifi, “Migration and global environmental change: 
methodological lessons from mountain areas of  the global south”, Earth System 
Dynamics, European Geosciences Union, vol. 6, 2015, pp. 375-388.
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with projections varying widely between 25 and 300 million 
by 205035. Figure 2.4 demonstrates the recent trends in migra-
tion from countries vulnerable to climate change, though it is 
important to consider that climate-induced migration is un-
likely to be the primary reason for an individual’s migration, as 
opposed to being a catalyst exacerbating common push factors 
which lead people to migrate. There is an international need to 
recognise migration as an adaptive strategy in the face of cli-
mate breakdown (ODI brief ). Decision makers will increasing-
ly have to decide between increasing resilience in areas under 
threat and facilitating migration from those areas36. Much of 
the necessary steps to facilitate resilience against and migration 
from climate change will require actions from developed states 
to ensure they meet the 2030 Agenda and “leave no one be-
hind”. Building resilience for all is key to this37, and helping 
achieve such reliance will better mitigate the destructive forc-
es of climate breakdown and its implications for migration to 
Europe in the XXI century. 
Integrating Migration in the 2030 Agenda 
Development policies and programmes can be part of a com-
prehensive strategy to better manage migration and make the 
most of its economic and social benefits. To do this, migration 
must be better integrated in the delivery of the 2030 Agenda 
across all its objectives. In order to “mainstream” migration into 
the 2030 Agenda, the links, opportunities and challenges re-
lated to migration under specific goals and targets need to be 
identified and highlighted (as we do in our briefings) and con-
sidered in policy processes.
35 F. Gemenne, “Why the numbers don’t add up: A review of  estimates and 
predictions of  people displaced by environmental changes”, Global Environmental 
Change, vol. 21, 2011, S41-S49.
36 E. Wilkinson et al. (2016).
37 Ibid.
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Fig. 2.4 - Migration flows from countries vulnerable 
to climate change
Source E. Wilkinson, L. Schipper, C. Simonet, and Z. Kubik, 
Climate change, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 
ODI Briefing Note, 2016 
Here, it is important that the role of migration is considered in 
Member States’ voluntary national reviews (VNRs). Member 
States are already making progress on this: in 2017, 29 out 
of 43 included the terms “migration”/“migrant”, “refugee”, 
“human trafficking”/“traffic in”, “internally displaced persons 
(IDPs)” and/ or “remittances” (CDP Subgroup on Voluntary 
National Reviews, 2018). At the same time, we need to consid-
er that migrants may have specific vulnerabilities and can have 
specific needs, which should be taken into account to achieve 
the principle of leaving no one behind. In 2017, only 25 of 
43 VNRs mentioned migrants and refugees as a “left behind” 
group, though not always with specific actions or strategies 
attached38. 
38 Ibid.
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Furthermore, policy-makers need to consider, measure and 
take account of migration to harness its positive benefits and re-
duce potential challenges. Migration should be part of regional, 
national and local level development planning and strategies, 
from initial context assessments, strategic goal-setting and plan-
ning, right through to monitoring and evaluation. A growing 
number of countries are doing this: for example, Bangladesh’s 
7th five-year plan includes “migration for development” within 
its development strategy39. Beyond state level involvement, the 
multiple facets of the relationship between migration and devel-
opment offer concrete and sector-specific policy entry points. 
For instance, the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) de-
cent work agenda is highly relevant to migration. Any program-
ming as part of this agenda should consider the specific vulnera-
bilities of migrants in the workplace40 and the barriers migrants 
face in accessing work-place social protection schemes41. 
Conclusion: The Global Compact for Migration 
and Making Migration and Development Work
The links between migration and development also have im-
plications for migration policy and practice, particularly for 
the implementation of the Global Compact for Migration 
(GCM). To date, we have seen little contact and collabora-
tion between the migration and global development policy 
and practice communities. The GCM – an effort by states to 
work towards a common approach to address global migra-
tion, recognising its impact on development – represents an 
39 Planning Commission, “Seventh five-year plan FY2016 – FY2020: acceler-
ating growth, empowering citizens”, General Economics Division, Planning 
Commission, Government of  the People’s Republic of  Bangladesh, 2015.
40 P. Lucci et al. (2016).
41 J. Hagen-Zanker, E. Mosler Vidal, and G. Sturge, Social protection, migration and 
the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, ODI Briefing Note, London, Overseas 
Development Institute (ODI), 2017.
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opportunity to correct this and make real progress42. The text 
of the GCM states that it:
Is rooted in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and 
builds upon its recognition that migration is a multidimension-
al reality of major relevance for the sustainable development of 
countries of origin, transit and destination, which requires co-
herent and comprehensive responses43. 
The text also goes beyond the specific migration targets set 
out in Table 2.1, stating that the GCM “aims to leverage the 
potential of migration for the achievement of all Sustainable 
Development Goals”. Furthermore, in Objective 23, Member 
States commit to aligning the implementation of the GCM, the 
2030 Agenda and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, recognising 
that migration and sustainable development are multidimen-
sional and interdependent. 
From January 2019, Member States will work on implement-
ing this Compact, and herein lies the potential for real change. 
While the framework and aspirations are global, actions need to 
be locally led and rooted in specific contexts, countries, regions, 
and markets where particular development opportunities and 
challenges exist44. These actions must be carried out by a broad 
range of stakeholders, working together in unique coalitions. 
In addition to Member States and the UN system, businesses 
will need to play a more central role (given their intrinsic inter-
est in labour mobility), together with city leaders, academics, 
journalists, and others who can help discover and test new ide-
as. Strategies should be flexible, and modalities of intervention 
should adapt to specific needs and opportunities. It will be im-
portant to avoid “blueprint” approaches and unrealistic prom-
ises if we are to make the most of bringing these two interlinked 
agendas together for concrete change. 
42 M. Foresti, “Summary remarks”, Fourth Thematic Consultation on Global 
Compact for Migration, 2017.
43 United Nations (UN), Global Compact for Migration. New York, 2018.
44 M. Foresti (2017).
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Finally, from an implementation perspective, how to do de-
velopment is as important as what to do. There is the risk that 
viewing migration through a development lens may reinforce 
or replicate unhelpful dichotomies of donor and recipient or 
origin and host country. For example, the fact that in some 
host countries (especially in Europe) development aid is being 
used as part of a broader strategy to deter migration raises many 
concerns; not only it is ineffectual (there is no evidence that 
aid can affect migration patterns) but it also risks misinforming 
the public about the positive relationship between development 
and migration. Instead, the SDGs are an opportunity to frame 
migration and development relationships between countries as 
reciprocal and mutual, under a global framework. 
Tab. 2.2 - The impact of migration on different SDGs and targets
Goal Target Briefing Link with migration
1.a Poverty Remittances and other forms of diaspora financing can be mobilised to improve infrastructure, services 
and development in origin countries.
1.a Social
protection
Labour migrants present an opportunity to increase the tax base, and a greater number of contributors to 
social insurance-type schemes leads to better risk pooling and financial sustainability.
1.b Poverty Migration is a key poverty reduction strategy and can be included in policy frameworks.
1.1,  
1.2
Poverty Migration is a powerful poverty reduction strategy, for migrants themselves and their families in origin 
countries.
1.1 Education If migrants have access to education, it can lead to higher incomes.
1.1 Urbanisation Rural to urban migration contributes to economic development in origin countries and poverty
reduction for migrants themselves.




Labour migrants can be a particularly poor and vulnerable group, but often lack eligibility for legal social 
protection and/or are not effectively covered.
1.3 Urbanisation Due to lack of formal registration in the city, many (poor) internal migrants cannot access social
protection systems. 
1.4 Poverty Migration can help families in origin countries improve their wellbeing through increased income, 
consumption and resilience.
1.4 Water Managing water resources sustainably, and providing water, sanitation and hygiene services, can enable 
successful migration, playing an important role in reducing poverty for migrants.
1.5 Climate
change
The poor are the most vulnerable to climate change, and are also the people who will find it hardest to 
migrate.
2.2 Health Migrants are a particularly vulnerable group but may not be reached by assistance programmes aimed at 
improving nutrition.
3 Education Education, particularly female education, has a strong impact on the future health outcomes of migrant 
students and their families.
3 Poverty Migration improves healthcare access and health outcomes for families in origin countries.
3.1 Health Migrants are vulnerable to poor health outcomes, yet find it difficult to access health-care services in 
transit and host countries; the services they can access are often sub-standard.
3.3 Water In origin countries, poor water, sanitation and hygiene services can contribute to health shocks that 
inhibit successful migration. 
3.8 Citizenship Eligibility for health access is often tied to residency and/or citizenship status, with only some countries 
opening up (emergency) health care to all.
3.8 Health Internal migrants often work in the informal sector and aren’t covered by insurance, including universal  
health coverage.
3.8 Urbanisation Internal migrants often end up in a city’s informal sector and therefore invisible to universal health
coverage programmes.
4 Poverty Migration helps improve education access and outcomes for families in origin countries, helping to 
reduce poverty. 
4.1 Citizenship Eligibility for education is often tied to residency and/or citizenship status, which means that migrant 
children can be excluded.
4.1,  
4.3
Decent work Primary, secondary and higher education is necessary for the attainment of decent work later in life - 
particularly that which demands highly skilled individuals.
4.4 Urbanisation Internal migrants often lack the skills and training required to access decent jobs in the city and as a 






Education While migration helps improve both education access and quality for families in origin countries,
migrant children in host countries are often excluded from quality education.
5.2 Decent work Foreign domestic work is a key area of employment for female labour migrants, but also one of the least 
protected in terms of exploitation and violation of rights.
5.2 Gender Migrant and refugee women and girls can experience violence at all stages of the migration process,
especially during transit (e.g. at refugee camps) or in their host country (e.g. by an employer).
5.3 Education If migrant children are enrolled in education, they are better able to resist child, early and forced
marriage and female genital mutilation, and host-country governments can more easily intervene.
5.3 Gender Girls facing harmful practices such as female genital mutilation or forced marriage may use migration as 
a means of escape.
5.4 Social
protection
Migrant women often lack regularised status or access to social insurance through their employer.
5.4 Urbanisation Many migrant domestic workers in cities are female. Actions that increase the value of domestic work 
would enhance the well-being, dignity and status of migrant workers.
6.1 
6.2
Health Large-scale movements of people can increase stress on fragile water supply systems in origin and host 
countries. This can lead to adverse health effects such as disease.
6.1 
6.2
Water Migrants can face significant barriers in accessing water, sanitation and hygiene services, particularly 
when they are in transit or undocumented. 
7 Energy By moving, migrants can improve their access to affordable, reliable, renewable modern energy services. 
4.4 Urbanisation Internal migrants often lack the skills and training required to access decent jobs in the city and as a 
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5.2 Gender Migrant and refugee women and girls can experience violence at all stages of the migration process,
especially during transit (e.g. at refugee camps) or in their host country (e.g. by an employer).
5.3 Education If migrant children are enrolled in education, they are better able to resist child, early and forced
marriage and female genital mutilation, and host-country governments can more easily intervene.
5.3 Gender Girls facing harmful practices such as female genital mutilation or forced marriage may use migration as 
a means of escape.
5.4 Social
protection
Migrant women often lack regularised status or access to social insurance through their employer.
5.4 Urbanisation Many migrant domestic workers in cities are female. Actions that increase the value of domestic work 
would enhance the well-being, dignity and status of migrant workers.
6.1 
6.2
Health Large-scale movements of people can increase stress on fragile water supply systems in origin and host 
countries. This can lead to adverse health effects such as disease.
6.1 
6.2
Water Migrants can face significant barriers in accessing water, sanitation and hygiene services, particularly 
when they are in transit or undocumented. 
7 Energy By moving, migrants can improve their access to affordable, reliable, renewable modern energy services. 
9 Poverty Migration can foster innovation in host countries through greater diversity, and in origin countries 
through social remittances, skills transfers and return migration.
9.5 Technology Migration can enhance the technological capabilities of natives in host countries who work directly with 
high-skilled migrants, and of those in origin countries working with diaspora networks.
8 Poverty Migration and remittances can lead to economic growth, a reduction in unemployment and increased 
wages in origin countries.
8 Social
protection
Migration can be an important contribution to economic development in origin countries through 
remittances, investment and knowledge exchange. 
8.1 Decent work Migration can contribute to economic growth across different ‘migration spaces’ (at host, in transit and 
at origin).
8.1 Education The extent of education access and quality are important drivers of economic growth and differences in 
growth rates between regions.
8.2 Technology High-skilled migrants contribute to innovation and increase productivity by conducting research and 
development, creating new products and improving existing products.
8.5 Decent work In host countries, high-skilled migration can create new jobs for natives through new businesses, but 
low-skilled migration can have a ‘crowding out’ effect.
8.5 Gender Female refugees and migrants may be prevented from working, experience de-skilling, or be confined to 
‘feminine’ jobs which are often paid or valued less than other work.
8.7 Gender Female migrants (particularly irregular migrants and children) are at risk of forced labour, trafficking, 
and exploitation and abuse. 
8.8 Decent work Labour migrants are disproportionately affected by violations of employment rights. Efforts must clearly 
establish whose responsibility it is to protect those rights, and ensure proper enforcement. 
8.5 
8.8
Urbanisation Low-skilled rural to urban migrants seeking better job opportunities in the city often end up working in 
precarious occupations in the informal economy.
10 Poverty Migration can reduce global inequalities, among countries and people, as people migrate from low- to 
high-income countries, and send remittances back home.
10.c Urbanisation Internal remittances to poor households are often sent through informal channels as poor internal
migrants do not have access to bank accounts. Such services can be riskier and more expensive. 
10.1 Education Access to education can reduce inequality through raising incomes and reducing poverty for migrants, 
and boosting growth rates and government revenues in host countries.
10.2 Education Education can improve the social, economic and political inclusion of migrant children, particularly if 
they are able to speak the majority language. 
10.4 Social
protection
Labour migrants are often not eligible for social protection, nor do they take it up. If vulnerable groups 
are unable to participate in social protection, inequalities widen.
10.7 Energy To ensure safe and responsible migration, especially in transit, migrants need access to modern energy 
services.
10.7 Technology Digital apps and mobile technologies can facilitate migration and integration into host countries. 
10.7 Urbanisation Some countries discourage internal migration for work, having a direct impact on migrants’ well-being 
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11.1 Water Providing water, sanitation and hygiene services to slums and informal areas can help reduce inequalities 
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services and achieve strong learning outcomes. 
11.3 Urbanisation If host countries are to maximise the benefits of migration, they must take into account the needs of 
poor internal migrants and enhance their well-being.
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and financial planning need to take these patterns into account.
10 Poverty Migration can reduce global inequalities, among countries and people, as people migrate from low- to 
high-income countries, and send remittances back home.
10.c Urbanisation Internal remittances to poor households are often sent through informal channels as poor internal
migrants do not have access to bank accounts. Such services can be riskier and more expensive. 
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13 Climate 
change
Migration is an adaptation strategy to climate change – both extreme and slow-onset changes. Policies 
and financial planning need to take these patterns into account.
16 Citizenship Lack of citizenship/permanent residency can prevent migrants from being full members of society and 
can lead to tensions and conflict.




Health Many migrants lack legal identity, yet such an identity is important to effectively plan and establish 
health support systems.
16.2 Education Providing financial support to families in an attempt to eliminate child labour, exploitation
and trafficking will most likely boost education for migrant children.
16.3 Citizenship When migrants cannot obtain residency and/or citizenship status, they may struggle to get
equal treatment within the justice system or access legal aid.
17 Education Data pertaining to migration background and education level is not collected together. This information 
should be used to support vulnerable groups, and not for reporting to security-related institutions.
17 Health There are no international standardised approaches for monitoring the health of migrants. Such data 
would help understand migrant health needs.
17.6 Technology Enhancing technological sharing, transfer, dissemination and education between host
and origin countries would ensure migration contributes to economic transformation.
17.8 Urbanisation There is only limited data on internal migration. Improving the evidence base would enable us to better 
understand the scale and impact of internal migration, and design better policies.
3. The Future of Legal Migration:
Labour Migration Pathways
Between Europe and Africa
Michael Clemens, Helen Dempster, Kate Gough
Will economic development in poor countries cause less migra-
tion, or more? This is a difficult question to answer. Certainly, 
the rhetoric of many policymakers throughout Europe shows 
that they believe that providing aid, or addressing the “root 
causes” of emigration, will reduce movement. The theory is 
that people are moving due to a lack of economic opportunity, 
conflict, or climate change, and that the impact of all of these 
things can be reduced through targeted aid investments. This 
chapter will argue that this view is too simplistic. Yes, European 
policymakers should be targeting aid investment at employ-
ment creation and economic development, and they should be 
putting in place robust border enforcement. But without pro-
moting new kinds of legal labour migration pathways they will 
not be able to manage this movement in the longer term, or 
take advantage of the potentially positive impact it could have 
on European labour markets.
The Relationship between Migration 
and Development
The relationship between migration and development is 
complex, but there is a wealth of evidence that shows that 
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development can increase migration (see figure 3.1)1. The ev-
idence shows a clear inverted-U relationship between emigra-
tion and economic development. Contrary to the rhetoric of 
policymakers, economic development and emigration actually 
go hand in hand up to a point. This is what we call the “mo-
bility transition”, with the “hump” occurring at approximately 
US$7,000-$8,000 PPP, or an upper-middle income country. 
At current growth rates, many poor countries are going to take 
generations to get over the “hump”, despite increased aid and 
economic investment.
Fig. 3.1 - To a point, development and emigration 
go hand in hand
Source: World Bank data quoted in M. Clemens, Does Development Reduce 
Migration?, CGD Working Paper 359, 2014
1 M. Clemens, Does Development Reduce Migration?, CGD Working Paper 359, 
Center for Global Development, Washington D.C., 2014. 
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In applying this US$7,000-$8,000 PPP threshold to sub-Saha-
ran Africa, we see the majority of countries fall on the left-hand 
side of the inverted-U (see Figure 3.2). The countries in yellow 
are those that fall above the US$7,000 PPP threshold, but the 
majority of countries fall below that level. Therefore, it is likely 
that we will see an increase in emigration from these countries 
in the years to come.
Fig. 3.2 - Most sub-Saharan African countries will experience 
more migration in the decades to come
Source: World Bank, GDP per capita at PPP (current international $)
This relationship between economic development and emigra-
tion is an inexact science. There are many reasons why a coun-
try wouldn’t follow this pattern – conflict and climate change 
being the largest factors. However, there are six main reasons 
why we see countries following this pattern which appear to 
hold constant in all countries analysed in Figure 3.2.
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1. Demographics. At early stages of development, rising 
incomes cause child mortality to fall quicker than fertil-
ity. That means a rise in the youth population. Not only 
does this mean there are normally too many people for 
the number of jobs, but young people are also more 
likely to move.
2. Credit constraints. Migration is expensive – paying for 
recruitment fees, insurance, transportation, education, 
visa fees and passports. Eventually, migrants will earn 
more money by moving, but these benefits accrue in 
the future. As a country develops, people gain more and 
more money, they gain access to loans and other finan-
cial markets, and they are more likely to know other 
people who have moved, who send money home in the 
form of remittances. This money allows new people to 
afford the journey.
3. Information. Once a few people have moved, they pro-
vide information to those people back home – about 
job searching, earning potential, cost of living, marriage 
partners, legal formalities, and ways to move. This re-
duces the risk of moving ‘blind’.
4. Structural change. As a country develops, some sectors 
increase, and others decline. This is why we see so much 
rural-to-urban migration. But some of those people 
may want to move abroad rather than adapting to this 
new reality.
5. Inequality. As we all know, economic development 
doesn’t benefit all people equally. Some people may feel 
like they’re not benefiting from the growth of their coun-
try, and feel that they could do better in a different one.
6. Immigration barriers abroad. Up to this point, we’ve 
just talked about changes in the demand for migration, 
but the supply of opportunities matters too. As a coun-
try gets richer, they’re more likely to produce higher-ed-
ucated and skilled people, who are more in demand 
abroad.
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And migration can contribute to development. In moving, 
migrants increase their income and knowledge, allowing them 
to spend more on meeting their basic needs and making fu-
ture investments. In countries of origin, migration can lead to 
increased wages and greater economic growth through high-
er incomes, increased remittances, spending, knowledge and 
technology transfers, and investment by migrant households. 
In countries of destination, migrants can fill labour gaps and 
contribute to services, taxes, and social security systems2. In 
this way, migration and development are inherently linked – 
increased emigration can reflect, and be a vehicle for, increased 
development. And in a stable context over time, development 
will create enough economic growth to push the community 
past the curve to the point where migration pressures decrease3.
A Challenge and an Opportunity
What do we know about how this applies to sub-Saharan 
Africa? The working-age population in sub-Saharan Africa is 
booming. This results from a significant development achieve-
ment: the reduction in the under-five mortality rate4. But it also 
creates a challenge. Last year, the International Monetary Fund 
found that sub-Saharan Africa will need to create 20 million 
new jobs every year to keep pace with population growth5. And 
these jobs need to be in higher value-added and higher-skilled 
occupations. At current growth levels, it is going to be difficult 
for local labour markets to satisfy this demand. Given these 
2 M. Foresti, J. Hagen-Zanker, and H. Dempster, Migration and Development: How 
Human Mobility Can Help Achieve the Sustainable Development Goals, ODI Briefing 
Note, London, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), 2018.
3 M. Clemens and K. Gough, K. (2019) “Unpacking the Relationship between 
Migration and Development to Help Policymakers Address Africa-Europe 
Migration”, CGD blog, Center for Global Development, Washington D.C., 2019. 
4 UNICEF for every child, “Under-Five Mortality Rate Data”, 2018.
5 A. Abdychev, “The future of  work in sub-Saharan Africa”, International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), African Department, no. 18, 2018.
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demographic trends, and the presence of the other five factors 
within the region, we are likely to see an increase in migration 
from sub-Saharan Africa in the decades to come. Of course, 
most people will elect to move regionally, and the number of 
those moving regionally is increasing faster than the number 
moving internationally6. But others will seek work elsewhere, in 
places such as Europe, to pursue fulfilling livelihoods and send 
remittances back home. 
This presents a significant opportunity for Europe. Europe is 
experiencing significant demographic shifts. By 2100, its work-
ing-age population is projected to decline by almost 30 per cent 
from 2015 levels (see Figure 3.3) owing to a combination of 
low birth rates and increased longevity. The impact of this shift 
is already being felt as the private sector in many countries de-
mands an increase in the number of workers available and the 
types of skills they possess. If Europe is to continue to grow and 
sustain its current social programmes, it will need a substantial 
increase in the number and type of potential workers7.
So if Europe wants to harness the development potential of 
migration, both within its own shores and within sub-Saharan 
Africa, it needs to do three things:
• Enact robust border enforcement which includes a hu-
mane and effective security system, and managed re-
turns and reintegration efforts with countries of origin;
• Target aid and development efforts in countries of or-
igin, particularly those aimed at employment creation 
and general economic growth; and
• Promote new kinds of legal labour migration pathways 
to manage migration in a mutually beneficial way.
Only by pursuing all three of these routes in tandem can Europe 
manage this demographic pressure in the years to come. 
6 M. McAuliffe and A. Kitimbo, “African Migration: What the Numbers Really 
Tell Us”, World Economic Forum blog, 7 June 2018.
7 L. Pritchett, “Europe’s Refugee Crisis Hides a Bigger Problem”, CGD blog, 
Center for Global Development, Washington, D.C., 2015.
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Fig. 3.3 - Europe’s working-age population 
will continue to decline
Note: This projection uses the “medium-variant”, which assumes a continuation 
of recent levels of net migration (the difference between the number of immi-
grants and the number of emigrants for a given country or group of countries).  
For more information, see United Nations Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs (UN DESA), “World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, Key 
Findings and Advance Tables”, 2017; and UN DESA, “Population Facts”, 2017.
Source: UN DESA, “Population Division World Population Prospects”, 2017.
The European Union’s Added Value 
and Its Progress to Date
In May 2015, the European Commission presented the com-
prehensive European Agenda on Migration8. It was designed 
to immediately respond to the 2015 refugee “crisis” through 
four pillars, aimed at better managing migration over the me-
dium- and long-term. Under these pillars, the Commission 
has achieved much – increasing refugee resettlement numbers, 
supporting Member States with border management, financing 
integration projects, combating smuggling networks, fighting 
trafficking, and working broadly on development and security 
8 European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs, “European Agenda on 
Migration”, 2015.
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efforts in countries of origin through the European Union Trust 
Funds9. In so doing, the Commission has achieved numerous 
successes, including reducing the level of irregular arrivals (see 
Figure 3.4).
Fig 3.4  - The number of irregular border crossings into 
Europe has fallen since 2015
Source: FRONTEX (European Border and Coast Guard Agency), updated 
September 2019 at https://frontex.europa.eu/along-eu-borders/migratory-map/
However, given the demographic projections detailed above 
and other forces beyond the Commission’s control – foreign 
wars, displacement, and climate change, among others – future 
9 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the European Council and the Council: Progress Report 
on the Implementation of  the European Agenda on Migration”, Brussels, 
COM(2019) 126 final, 6 March 2019.
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success is not guaranteed. Furthermore, the Commission’s 
successes to date largely depend on the cooperation of third 
states, which may not be assured moving forward. And with no 
broad European consensus on how to best manage migration, 
European states too often depend on ad hoc solutions.
The Commission has acknowledged that while both develop-
ment and border controls are necessary, they are insufficient to 
curb irregular migration. To reduce the incentives for irregular 
migration, attract the right set of talent and skills to Europe, and 
enable admissions to be tailored to the needs of the labour mar-
ket, Europe needs new kinds of legal pathways for migrants10. 
Without these pathways, the EU’s economic growth will suffer. 
Accordingly, promoting new legal pathways is the fourth pillar 
of the European Agenda on Migration. These pathways take 
three forms: attracting new talent, the Blue Card Directive11, 
and European-coordinated pilot projects. These measures re-
flect the Commission’s limited room to manoeuvre as Member 
States retain the right to determine volumes of admission for 
people coming from third countries to seek work.
The Commission launched the idea of legal migration pilot 
projects in 2017 in order to “replace irregular migratory flows 
with safe, orderly and well-managed legal migration pathways; 
and to incentivise cooperation on issues such as prevention of 
irregular migration, readmission and return of irregular mi-
grants”12. The following year, the Commission published the 
“Concept Note on the Pilot Projects on Legal Migration”13. It 
10 K. Luyten and S. González Diaz, “Legal Migration to the EU”, European 
Parliamentary Research Service Briefing, 2019.
11 The Blue Card Directive governs the conditions for entry and residence of  high-
ly qualified third-country workers in the European Union. Due to low take-up, 
reforms to the Directive were proposed in 2016 but have not yet been enacted.
12 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the European Council and the Council: Managing mi-
gration in all its aspects: progress under the European Agenda on Migration”, 
Brussels, 4 December 2018.
13 International Center for Migration Policy Development, “Concept Note: Pilot 
Projects Legal Migration”, 2018.
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listed the target countries, described the application process, 
and identified the funding streams14. One such stream was the 
Mobility Partnerships Facility (MPF), a flexible and quick-re-
action mechanism funded by the Directorate-General for 
Migration and Home Affairs15.
Four Member States applied to the MPF for funding, in-
cluding the Belgian Development Agency, Enabel. Its “Pilot 
Project Addressing Labour Shortages Through Innovative 
Labour Migration Models” is directly applying the Global Skill 
Partnership model, training information and communications 
technology (ICT) workers for employment in Morocco and 
Flanders16. While it is too early to evaluate the pilot’s impact, 
all actors involved have reiterated the need for such a project 
to meet demand on both sides. All pilot projects funded by the 
MPF are investing in skills and human capacity (the latter, for 
example, through training or internship programmes delivered 
in European Member States).
14 The EU Trust Fund for Africa, North Africa Window, provides funding 
for a regional project in North Africa, carried out by GIZ, the International 
Organization for Migration, and the International Labour Organization.
15 The MPF is coordinated by the International Center for Migration Policy 
Development under the leadership of  the Directorate-General for Migration 
and Home Affairs (DG HOME). The Steering Committee also includes rep-
resentatives from the Directorates-General Neighbourhood and Enlargement 
Negotiations (DG NEAR) and International Cooperation and Development 
(DG DEVCO) and the European External Action Service (EEAS). It was orig-
inally provided €5.5 million for 35 months (from January 2016). New funding 
was then granted to rapidly support the pilot projects. The MPF now has another 
€12.5 million for 36 months (from January 2018). A new phase will start in au-
tumn 2019. Funding comes from the Asylum, Migration, and Integration Fund; 
the Internal Security Fund for Police Cooperation; and the Internal Security 
Fund for Borders and Visa.
16 For more information, see the Pilot Project Addressing Labour Shortages 
Through Innovative Labour Migration Models page on the Enabel website: 
www.enabel.be/content/europees-proefproject-palim-linkt-it-ontwikkeling-ma-
rokko-aan-knelpuntberoepen-vlaanderen-0
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The Case for a Global Skill Partnership
Decisions about the number and type of labour migrants ad-
mitted across national borders are the exclusive competence of 
Member States. The Commission cannot propose a “common 
migration policy” along the lines of its Common European 
Asylum System. However, it does have an important role to 
play in promoting, facilitating, and supporting the creation of 
new kinds of legal labour migration pathways across Europe.
A Global Skill Partnership is such a pathway17. It is a bilateral 
agreement between equal partners. The country of destination 
agrees to provide technology and finance to train potential mi-
grants with targeted skills in the country of origin, prior to mi-
gration, and receives migrants with precisely the skills they need 
to integrate and contribute best upon arrival. The country of 
origin agrees to provide that training and gets support for the 
training of non-migrants, too – increasing rather than draining 
human capital.
For example, both Morocco and the Flanders region of 
Belgium have identified a shortage of trained ICT workers. 
Belgium has agreed to finance and support the training of ICT 
workers in Morocco, some of whom will stay and contribute 
to the Moroccan labour market. Others will move to Flanders 
to take up contracts with Belgian companies. This latter group 
will also receive language and integration training and be con-
nected to local diaspora networks once they arrive.
Six traits distinguish Global Skill Partnerships from existing 
related policies. Global Skill Partnerships:
17 The Global Skill Partnership idea is backed by peer-reviewed academic research 
including M. Clemens, “Global Skill Partnerships: A Proposal for Technical 
Training in a Mobile World”, IZA Journal of  Labor Policy, vol. 4, no. 2, 2015; and 
M. Clemens and K. Gough, “A Tool to Implement the Global Compact for 
Migration: Ten Key Steps for Building Global Skill Partnerships,” Center for 
Global Development, CGD Brief, Center for Global Development, Washington 
D.C., December 2018. For more information, see www.cgdev.org/gsp.
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• Manage future migration pressure, addressing many le-
gitimate concerns about migration in countries of des-
tination (such as integration and fiscal impact) and in 
countries of origin (such as skills drain).
• Directly involve employers in the country of destina-
tion to identify and train for specific skills they need 
that can be learned relatively quickly.
• Form a public-private partnership for semi-skilled work 
– jobs that take between several months and three years 
to learn and do not require a university degree.
• Create skills before migration, with cost savings to the 
country of destination and spillover benefits from train-
ing centres in the country of origin.
• Promote development by bundling training for mi-
grants with training for non-migrants in the country 
of origin, according to the differing needs of each. 
Such training occurs in two tracks: a “home” track 
for non-migrants, and an “away” track for migrants. 
Trainees can pick which track to go down – those who 
choose to migrate could also receive additional training 
in soft skills, for example in different languages or other 
facets of integration.
• Are highly flexible. Any agreement can, and must, be 
adapted to the specific country needs in both destina-
tion and origin.
Who benefits from such a model? Effectively, everyone in-
volved. Europe, in containing countries of destination, receives 
migrants with the skills to contribute to the maximum extent 
and integrate quickly, without being a net drain on fiscal or 
human resources. They can regulate how migration happens, 
and on what terms, choosing those migrants who fit a specif-
ic skills profile and who can contribute and integrate quickly. 
Countries of destination therefore benefit in four ways: (1) ad-
dressing their own demographic change, (2) accomplishing de-
velopment objectives, (3) increasing migrant integration, and 
(4) contributing to deterring irregular flows.
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The country of origin gets new technology and training fa-
cilities, an increase in human capital from those who stay, the 
prospect of remittances from those who leave, and a reduction 
in pressure to absorb new labour market entrants.
Those who are trained can migrate regularly and safely or stay 
and enter the local labour market with better skills. All have 
their earning potential increased, with flow-on benefits.
And everyone else benefits from having skills gaps filled, in-
cluding those with secondary jobs who rely on those roles being 
occupied, and those who will occupy new jobs created by those 
who move and stay. 
Creating new kinds of legal labour migration pathways is, 
of course, a difficult task in today’s political climate. A growing 
number of politicians advocate for closing national borders and 
reducing immigrant populations. However, we believe that the 
Global Skill Partnership model is likely to gain traction among 
even the more conservative Member States for the following 
reasons:
• The number of migrants admitted is small and there-
fore unlikely to attract much political attention; 
• Migrants have been selected and brought to the country 
of destination to meet specific skills needs that locals are 
unable to meet, and have already been provided with 
language and integration training;
• The potential migrants will be screened and vetted 
before they enter the country of destination and easi-
ly tracked after they arrive, thereby satisfying security 
concerns; 
• The model meets the desire among countries of desti-
nation to participate in the “development” of countries 
of origin; and
• It provides countries of destination with a practical 
and pragmatic way to control some migration flows 
and shift irregular flows into regular pathways, thereby 
satisfying voter demand for a “managed” immigration 
policy.
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Policy Recommendations for the European Union
The scale of the demographic shifts highlighted above means 
Europe cannot wait until migration flows visibly increase to 
implement a Global Skill Partnership. This tool should be test-
ed now, in a period of relative manageability, before the scale 
and pace of migration makes innovation difficult. We therefore 
believe this is a perfect time for the new Commission to expand 
the scale and scope of such legal labour migration pilots, testing 
new ways to ensure that migration benefits all involved.
Thankfully, the new President of the European Union 
Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, and her team acknowledge 
the need for a more comprehensive approach to migration, in-
cluding partnering with both countries of origin and countries 
of transit to create legal pathways to attract the skills Europe 
desperately needs. In September 2019, President-elect von der 
Leyen issued mission letters to all Commissioner-Designates, 
assigning their individual portfolios, priorities and institution-
al responsibilities for the period 2019-2024. She also revealed 
how these individual portfolios fit together to achieve the 
new Commission’s political guidelines. Three, Ylva Johansson 
(Home Affairs), Margaritis Schinas (Protecting our European 
Way of Life), and Jutta Urpilainen (International Partnerships) 
will all have some responsibility for managing migration within 
– and to – the European Union, with input from Josep Borrell, 
the European Union’s “chief diplomat”18.
Commissioner Johansson, in charge of the Directorate 
General for Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME), will 
oversee the biggest share of the migration portfolio. Von der 
Leyen has tasked her with developing a “New Pact on Migration 
and Asylum”. She will also have to reform the asylum system, 
promote sustainable search and rescue efforts, fight trafficking 
and smuggling, increase Frontex operations, and implement 
18 H. Dempster and A. Käppeli, “Commissioners Johansson, Schinas, and 
Urpilainen: Here’s How You Can Use Legal Pathways to “Manage Migration”, 
CGD blog, Center for Global Development, Washington D.C., 2019. 
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the Schengen Area rules around free movement. In addition, 
her mission letter contains two interesting sub-points:
You should focus on ensuring there are genuine legal path-
ways to the European Union, both through the resettlement 
of those in need of international protection and through em-
ployment opportunities for skilled workers. I want you to work 
closely with the High Representative/Vice-President and other 
Commissioners to develop stronger cooperation with countries 
of origin and transit. You should work closely with Member 
States to step up efforts to develop a more robust system of read-
mission and return. [their emphasis]
Clearly, the incoming European Commission-President has 
recognised the need to strengthen legal migration pathways to 
Europe, and that a successful migration policy framework re-
quires close collaboration with partner countries.
Commissioner Johansson’s portfolio will be overseen by 
Commissioner Schinas, the new Vice-President responsible for 
“Protecting our European Way of Life”. The media has criti-
cised this title for co-opting the way that the far right discusses 
migration and suggesting that there is indeed a European way 
of life. In response, Commissioner Schinas made clear during 
his hearing that he sees the “European way” as a commitment 
to inclusion, solidarity, and diversity. His mission will be to 
help implement the “New Pact on Migration and Asylum”, and 
to focus on:
creating pathways to legal migration to help us bring in people 
with the skills and talents our economy and labour market need.
And finally, to complement these efforts, Commissioner 
Urpilainen, in charge of “institutional partnerships” and 
the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and 
Development (DG DEVCO), will support the EC’s efforts on 
migration through trying:
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to reach comprehensive partnerships with countries of migra-
tion origin and transit, bringing together all instruments, tools 
and leverage. You should therefore be ready to adapt bilateral 
funding to achieve our objectives on migration management. 
[their emphasis]
While all three portfolios retain an emphasis on border enforce-
ment and security, these statements are a welcome shift towards 
a migration management approach that is more pragmatic 
and potentially beneficial for countries of origin, transit, and 
destination. It is especially interesting to see the expansion of 
legal pathways presented as a “carrot” alongside the “stick” of 
increased returns and re-admission agreements.
Yet there are also worrying signs of conditionality, potentially 
using “all instruments, tools and leverage” to secure such agree-
ments while offering little in return. It is telling that the mandate 
letter for Commissioner Urpilainen does not stress the impor-
tance of legal pathways for economic development in countries 
of origin, transit, and destination, and the centrality of promot-
ing these for decades to come. If the new Commissioners are to 
effectively carry out their mandates, they are going to need to 
invest funding and energy in both enforcement and new legal 
labour migration pathways.
While both increased development efforts and border con-
trols are necessary, they are insufficient to curb irregular mi-
gration – a fact which has been acknowledged by the outgo-
ing Commission. To reduce incentives for irregular migration, 
attract the right set of talent and skills to Europe, and ena-
ble admissions to be tailored to the needs of the labour mar-
ket, Europe needs new kinds of legal pathways for migrants. 
Accordingly, promoting new legal pathways is the fourth pillar 
of the European Agenda on Migration.
To date, the funding and attention paid to this fourth pil-
lar has been massively outweighed by the focus on enforce-
ment and border security. However, as demonstrated above, 
legal pathways are prominently mentioned in the incoming 
Commissioner’s mission letters. How can President von der 
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Leyen and her team implement those? Our “Roadmap for 
the New European Leadership”19 provides four ways that the 
European Commission can create new partnerships to manage 
migration in a mutually beneficial way.
Create and promote new kinds of legal labour migration 
pathways with more tangible benefits to countries of origin 
and destination. Such efforts can complement existing devel-
opment and security efforts within sub-Saharan and North 
Africa, reducing demand for irregular pathways and putting 
more control in the hands of Member States. The Commission 
has already established the building blocks for such efforts. The 
fourth pillar of the European Agenda on Migration provides a 
framework under which to create and promote new kinds of 
legal pathways, and existing trade relationships with sub-Saha-
ran Africa provide mechanisms upon which to base discussions. 
The Commission can support Member States by providing 
them with the tools, coordination mechanisms, and guidance 
to implement new kinds of legal pathways. We echo the find-
ings of the recent “Legal Migration Fitness Check”, which calls 
on the Commission to harmonise conditions, procedures, and 
rights to overcome fragmentation within the system20.
Pilot and scale Global Skill Partnership projects between 
Europe and sub-Saharan Africa. A Global Skill Partnership is 
a tool to manage migration, displace irregular migration flows, 
shape the terms on which migration happens, and ensure mi-
grants arrive with precisely the skills European destinations 
need. It is also a development tool in the country of origin, 
building sustainable institutions that create human capital and 
build capacity. As discussed above, the Commission is already 
supporting similar projects and should continue to do so by 
19 A. Käppeli, et al., “Building an EU-Africa Partnership of  Equals: A 
Roadmap for the New European Leadership”, CGD Report, Center for Global 
Development, Washington D.C., 2019.
20 European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs, “Commission Staff  
Working Document: Executive Summary of  the Fitness Check on EU Legislation 
on Legal Migration”, 2019.  
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expanding and diversifying the financing and support availa-
ble to the MPF and by promoting the opportunity to Member 
States based on their current and emerging needs and priorities. 
The Commission should also learn from the experiences of sim-
ilar projects, such as that being implemented between Germany 
and Kosovo in the construction industry21.
Pilot Global Skill Partnership projects within Africa. Many 
sub-Saharan Africans will not want to travel to Europe, prefer-
ring instead to seek work within their region. The Commission 
can finance partnerships between a country of origin (say, a 
developing sub-Saharan African country such as Niger) and a 
country of destination (say, a more developed North African 
country such as Tunisia). Such a partnership could build nec-
essary institutions and complementary skill sets among native 
and foreign workers in the country of destination, such as basic 
construction skills among Nigeriens and middle-management 
skills among Tunisians. This creates a complementary work-
force that helps alleviate pressures on both countries.
Be a positive voice for migration within Europe. Such ef-
forts will require an increase in financing, in coordination, in 
partnerships, and – most importantly – in leadership. We high-
light here the many benefits that migration can bring if prop-
erly managed, and propose a model to realise these benefits. 
However, such efforts will require political will and commit-
ment on the part of Member States and a supportive public 
narrative across Europe. It is imperative that the Commission 
remain an outspoken advocate for labour migration (and its 
necessity given the demographic shifts already underway) and 
showcase positive outcomes from the pilot projects. We have a 
real opportunity to facilitate new types of migration, but only 
if the Commission spearheads these efforts.
21 M. Clemens, H. Dempster, and K. Gough, “Maximizing the Shared Benefits 
of  Legal Migration Pathways: Lessons from Germany’s Skills Partnerships”, 
CGD Policy Paper 150, Center for Global Development, Washington D.C., 15 
July 2019. 
4.  Safe and Legal Pathways 
     for Refugees: Can Europe Take  
     Global Leadership?
Daniele Albanese, Matthieu Tardis 
The global population of forcibly displaced persons increased 
by 2.3 million people in 2018 to 70.8 million as a result of 
persecution, conflict, violence, or human rights violations. The 
refugee crisis’s geography shows that, contrary to European me-
dia narratives, the large majority of refugees (85%) are hosted 
in low- and middle-income countries1 and in Europe refugees 
comprise only about 0.4% of the overall population, while 
non-EU migrants comprise just 4%2.
Protracted refugee situations across the globe now last an 
estimated 26 years on average3 due to a lack of durable solu-
tions4. As a result, a growing number of refugees have embarked 
on dangerous journeys, albeit irregularly, often at the mercy of 
human smugglers and traffickers, paying exorbitant amounts 
and facing detention and treacherous conditions in transit 
1 UNHCR, Global trends. Forced displacement in 2018, June 2019. 
2 International Rescue Committee, Forging a common path: A European approach to the 
integration of  refugees and asylum-seekers, July 2018.
3 https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/events/
coordination/15/documents/papers/ 14_UNHCR_nd.pdf
4 Local integration, voluntary repatriation or Resettlement. https://www.unhcr.
org/solutions.html
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countries5, especially in Libya6. While safe, orderly and regular 
migration is documented as valuable to all parties involved, the 
European response – has so far mainly stressed external migra-
tion management and border control7, restrictive search and 
rescue operations, and strict visa policies8. Not surprisingly, sev-
eral commentators agree that this shift from regular entry to ir-
regular migration may be the result of more restrictive visa and 
external frontiers policies9. Europe could certainly learn from 
studies carried out over the last sixty years in the USA that show 
how the rigorous application of border restrictions has led to a 
reduction in irregular migration flows only when it has been 
accompanied by a significant, durable and credible increase in 
visa opportunities and regular journeys10.
Nevertheless, over the past few years, in Europe the issue of 
safe and legal channels to obtain protection has gained mo-
mentum. This renewed interest has been influenced by various 
factors, including the need to protect Syrian refugees, a growing 
willingness to share responsibility, the determination to address 
the dangerous central Mediterranean route, as well as mounting 
pressure from large portions of European society. 
The international refugee protection regime is at a crossroads. 
While most countries from the Global North are implementing 
5 On the connection between regular and irregular migration see: Exploring the 
Links Between Enhancing Regular Pathways and Discouraging Irregular Migration: A 
discussion paper to inform future policy deliberations, International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) UN Agency, 2018.
6 UNHCR, “Desperate Journeys. Refugees and migrants arriving in Europe and 
at Europe’s borders”, January-December 2018.
7 “The dangerous link between migration, development and security for the ex-
ternalisation of  borders in Africa”, Analysis document, Arci Italia, 31 July 2018.
8 International Organization for Migration (IOM), Flow Monitoring Europe and 
Missing Migrants Project.
9 M. Czaika and M. Hobolth, “Do Restrictive Asylum and Visa Policies Increase 
Irregular Migration into Europe?”, European Union Politics, vol. 17, no. 3, 2016, 
pp. 345-365.
10 M. Clemens and K. Gough, Can Regular Migration Channels Reduce Irregular 
Migration? Lessons for Europe from the United States, CGD Brief, Center for Global 
Development, Washington, D.C., February 2018.
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strict border controls, which affect the opportunities of refugees 
to access their territories, others are experimenting with safe 
and legal pathways, which might become the main channels 
to protection in Europe and North America11. This article asks 
whether and how the EU is developing safe and legal pathways 
for refugees. It will first review the global challenges related to 
safe and legal pathways and then question the rationale be-
hind the rise of resettlement and complementary pathways to 
Europe. Finally, it will use the cases of France and Italy to argue 
that citizen mobilisation can become the future of refugee pro-
tection in Europe. 
Resettlement and Complementary Pathways: 
A Toolkit for Refugee Protection
Safe and legal pathways are not a recent development. In fact, 
the global protection regime has always given the internation-
al community tools to provide solidarity with countries most 
affected by large influxes of people in need of protection. 
Resettlement and complementary pathways have been used for 
long. Considering the current global challenges related to the 
refugee situation, these tools are more needed than ever. 
Resettlement
Resettlement12 “involves the selection and transfer of refugees 
from a State in which they have sought protection to a third 
State which has agreed to admit them – as refugees – and grant 
11 It should be noted that the EU has drawn up a list of  visa-liberalised countries 
(VLC) whose citizens are exempt from having a visa for crossing EU external 
borders. In 2018, 115,000 applications were submitted (almost 20% of  all asy-
lum applications) by nationals from these countries. It marks a 30% increase 
over 2017 and by far the highest in recent years. Specifically the major increase 
comes from nationals from Colombia (+210%), Venezuela (+88%) and Georgia 
(+72%). See European Asylum Support Office (EASO), “EU+ Asylum Trends 
– 2018 Overview”, 13 February 2019. 
12 UNHCR, Resettlement Handbook, July 2011.
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them permanent residence status” and is the primary solution 
adopted worldwide. According to UNHCR estimates, in 2019 
the need for resettlement will affect around 1.4 million people 
(about 8% of the refugee population) globally. This figure is al-
most unchanged compared to 2017, but has increased by 50% 
compared to 2012.
In the face of growing needs, the response of the internation-
al community has been decidedly insufficient, even if resettle-
ment is a tool with remarkable potential for integration13. Until 
2016, the quotas available globally increased steadily to a record 
126,000 departures, while 2017 saw a sharp downturn, with 
only 65,000 people allowed to resettle14.
Complementary pathways
Admission programmes offering a mechanism for protection 
have become known as “complementary pathways”15. They in-
clude non-humanitarian means, such as procedures for family 
reunification, education (student visas) and labour mobility, 
which can serve to enhance refugee self-reliance by helping 
them to attain a durable solution, or humanitarian admission 
programmes, such as community sponsorship programmes, in 
addition to resettlement.
Family reunification16 is an essential tool to create socio-cul-
tural stability and represents one of the main avenues for legal 
migration to the EU. In 2018, 359,724 people obtained a res-
idence permit for family reasons, a number that accounts for 
13 D. Kerwin, “The US Refugee Resettlement Program – A Return to First 
Principles: How Refugees Help to Define, Strengthen, and Revitalize the United 
States”, Center for Migration Studies, Journal on Migration and Human Security, vol. 
6, no. 3, 2018, pp. 205-225.
14 UNHCR, UNHCR Projected 2019, global resettlement needs, Geneva, 25-26 June 
2018.
15 “Complementary pathways for admission of  refugees to third countries – Key 
consideration”, Office of  the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
Division of  International Protection (DIP), April 2019. 
16  Directive 2003/86/EC on Family reunification.
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approximately one-third of all arrivals17. However, the proce-
dure presents several complexities which make access difficult 
for applicants who are beneficiaries of international protection18.
Access to student visas19 and work permits for refugees, while 
encouraged by several recent research studies20, remains mar-
ginal not only in the EU but in all OECD countries (0.4% 
for student visas and 0.1% for work permits among the main 
asylum-seeking nationalities). 
Private or Community sponsorship originates in Canada 
where they have been available since 197821. Canada is a case 
of great interest because in addition to carrying out govern-
ment resettlement programs (GAR), it has for some decades 
now initiated private sponsorship initiatives, including in re-
sponse to humanitarian crises of significant proportions, such 
as that which occurred in Indochina in the 1970s. Since then, 
several other private sponsorship programs (PSRs – Private 
Sponsorship for Refugees Programs) have been implemented 
over the years, both in favour of particular nationalities, such as 
Afghans, Iraqis, or more recently Syrians, and through a system 
of quotas made available for this type of intervention that has 
17 Based on EUROSTAT data 2017-2018 (extracted in October 2019). There 
is a general lack of  comprehensive data on family reunification, particularly at 
national level, and there is no separation between migrants and refugees.
18 Realizing the right to family reunification of  refugees in Europe, Issue paper published 
by the Council of  Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, 2017.
19 Global enrolment rates referred to 2014 (UNESCO Institute for Statistics) 
and refugee enrolments rates refer to 2015 (UNHCR) refers that while 34% of  
the world’s population has access to higher education level, just 1% of  refugees 
attend university. 
20 OECD-UNHCR Study on third country solutions for refugees: family reunifi-
cation, study programmes and labour mobility (2018).
21 In Canada the Private Sponsorship of  Refugees programme (PSR) has been 
ongoing since 1978. Guide to the private sponsorship of  Refugees Program: 
https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/
publications-manuals/guide-private-sponsorship-refugees-program.html and 
Government of  Canada, Evaluation of  the Resettlement Programs, 2016 (GAR, 
PSR, BVOR and RAP), 7 July 2016, http:/www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/
evaluation/resettlement.asp
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TALENT BEYOND BOUNDARIES*
Talent Beyond Boundaries, an international NGO, establishes partnerships 
with companies around the world who are interested in recruiting from the 
Talent Catalog (an online database that allows refugees to share informa-
tion about their work experience, professional qualifications, and skills that 
counts over 15,000 displaced individuals registered) trying to linking them 
with skilled refugees and thus supporting a solution to the refugee crisis.
UNI-CO-RE**: University Corridors for Refugees (Ethiopia-Unibo 2019-21)
A good example of student visa access for refugees is Project UNI-CO-RE, 
which was created to allow refugee students from Ethiopia to continue their 
academic careers at the University of Bologna. Beneficiaries of the UNI 
CO-RE project enjoy support in:
• pre-enrolling at the Italian Embassy in Ethiopia and carrying out immi-
gration procedures;
• applying for admission to second-cycle degree programmes of the 
University of Bologna;
• integrating in the local student life and community.
And they will receive a financial benefit in order to cover the costs of stud-
ying and integration.
* https://talentbeyondboundaries.org/index.html
** UNI-CO-RE: University Corridors for Refugees (Ethiopia-Unibo 2019-21), Alma 
Mater Studiorum, University of Bologna.
progressively grown. In fact, in recent years, around 46% of all 
refugees resettled in Canada have been privately sponsored.
Private sponsorship allows refugees to enter through three 
types of sponsors:
• accredited organisations (the c.d. Sponsorship 
Agreement Holders, SAHs) that have formal agreements 
with the National Government Agency (Immigration, 
Refugees and Citizenship Canada - IRCC), to assist 
more refugees each year. Most of these organisations 
(SAH) are religious, ethnic, community or humanitari-
an, with previous sponsorship experience;
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• groups composed of a minimum of five Canadian citi-
zens or permanent residents over the age of 18 who can
sponsor a person’s entry to establish them in their local
community or a recognised refugee. Through this mo-
dality the numbers of beneficiaries are more contained;
• community groups (Community Sponsors - CS), i.e.
organisations and associations that operate in the same
community where the refugees will settle.
In 2013, a new semi-private sponsorship programme was 
launched, the BVOR (Blended Visa Office Referred), which is 
characterised by closer cooperation between public institutions 
and private sponsors, as will be seen in the next paragraph. The 
combined action between the aforementioned mixed model 
and the private sponsorship resulted in a 125% increase in ad-
missions in Canada.
The future of safe and legal channels for refugees
The future of safe and legal channels for refugees worldwide 
depends on a number of steps taken by the international com-
munity during the last years.
Indeed, in the attempt to address this sensitive issue at glob-
al level, the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants 
endorsed the development and expansion of Resettlement and 
Complementary pathways22. Building on this commitment, 
the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR)23 recognised that cre-
ating adequate instruments for the admission of refugees can 
facilitate access to protection, and also serves to express soli-
darity towards host countries and communities where immi-
grant numbers are higher. The signatory states agreed to devel-
op a system which aims at making opportunities available to 
22 UN General Assembly, “Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 19 
September 2016”, 3 October 2016.
23 Adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 2018, Report of  the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Global compact on refugees, 2018.
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refugees on a more systematic, organised and sustainable basis, 
and to adopt appropriate protection safeguards. 
With the strengthening of the GCR and in the spirit of the 
Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement (ATCR), a 
multi-stakeholder forum that brings together UNHCR, states, 
civil society, private sector and academia, a strategy has been 
devised which comprises a roadmap for expansion of safe and 
legal channels over the next three years (2019-2021), and a 
blueprint for the further development of third-country solu-
tions over the next 10 years (2019-2028) through an ambitious 
vision24 that will continue to be relevant to achieving the goals 
of the GCR in the longer term. 
This vision states that third-country solutions for refugees 
will expand so that by the end of 2028, 3 million refugees will 
benefit from effective protection and solutions through resettle-
ment in 50 resettlement countries (1 million) and complemen-
tary pathways (2 million). 
The Strategy’s vision, which implies the involvement of 
more actors, the availability of more places and the improving 
of quality and protection safeguards, has three distinct yet in-
ter-related goals and objectives:
1. Grow resettlement numbers with more countries initiat-
ing successful resettlement programmes. This means an
increase in numbers of places in existing programmes,
an expansion in the number of countries undertaking
resettlement, but also an increase in the protection
impact, efficiency and sustainability of programmes.
The goal is supposed to be achieved through 60,000
annual resettlement departures in 2019 followed by an
incremental increase of 10,000 departures per year to
end with 150,000 in 2028, together with an expansion
in the number of resettlement countries. In 2018, 29
countries were involved in resettlement, and through an
24 UNHCR, “The Three-Year (2019-2021) Strategy on Resettlement and 
Complementary Pathways”, June 2019.
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incremental increase of 2-3 new resettlement countries 
per year it is estimated that 50 countries will receive 
resettled refugees in 2028.
2. Advance complementary pathways, improving access
and developing more opportunities. The UNHCR-
OECD study on complementary pathways finds a ratio
of 2:1 when comparing first residence permits gained
by foreigners with resettlement quotas. Using this ratio,
the strategy states that by the end of 2028, 2 million
refugees can be admitted to third countries through
complementary pathways, based on the forecast for in-
creasing complementary pathway numbers incremen-
tally by 20,000 persons per year over a ten-year period,
starting in 201925.
3. Build the foundation to promote welcoming and in-
clusive societies. The GCR is entirely non-political in
nature but seeks to achieve its objectives through the
mobilisation of political will, a broadened base of sup-
port, and arrangements that facilitate more equitable,
sustained and predictable contributions among states
and other relevant stakeholders. It is based on the fun-
damental principle of international solidarity, which
can only be achieved if endorsed as a global public good
by third countries receiving refugees. An environment
that promotes solidarity, diversity and openness is es-
sential for resettlement and complementary pathways
to grow sustainably. Moreover, the arrival of refugees
can trigger positive social and economic changes, trans-
form civic culture and local institutions, and promote
social cohesion, particularly when local communities
are engaged in welcoming them.
25 In order to monitor the implementation of  the growing complementary path-
ways admission a more data-based evidence would be needed in future because 
there are insufficient and incomplete data on the availability and use of  comple-
mentary pathways.
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UN Member States thus recognise firstly that a multi-stake-
holder and partnership approach is the best way to expand the 
availability of safe and legal channels and secondly that this 
might become a sustainable policy approach that would not re-
quire new measures to be designed from scratch for each crisis. 
It would function instead as an ongoing programme that will, 
over time, strengthen the international refugee protection re-
gime. In the near future, we will see whether these declarations 
of intent remain a dead letter or find the adequate support to 
generate a real change in the management of refugee crises at a 
global level.
Safe and Legal Pathways to Europe: 
Protection or Migration Management Tools? 
Since 2015, refugee resettlement schemes have grown signifi-
cantly in the European Union to the point of becoming a key 
component of the European asylum strategy. The history of 
refugee protection in Europe is paved with many paradoxes. 
Resettlement is one of them. Europeans were the first beneficiar-
ies of this solution right after World War II. Western European 
countries were major actors of resettlement during the 1970s 
to address the plight of South Asian refugees. But with the ex-
ception of Scandinavian countries, resettlement ended up in 
the limbo of protection tools available to European countries, 
while security concerns became the main drivers of asylum pol-
icies during the 1980s. Despite a timid surge during the mid-
2000s26, European governments are only taking resettlement 
seriously in the post-2015 context. In light of the changing 
fortunes of resettlement in Europe during the last 70 years, we 
can question whether the current trends are going to be sus-
tainable. In other words, whether resettlement will become an 
26 For example, the United Kingdom adopted a resettlement scheme in 2005 
and France in 2008. The International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) 
Europe, Welcome to Europe: A Comprehensive Guide to Resettlement, July 2013.
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“ordinary” pathway to international protection to the EU is still 
uncertain. The sudden suspension of the Danish programme in 
201727, one of the oldest in Europe, emphasises that no reset-
tlement programme can be taken for granted. Likewise, not all 
EU Member States have committed to resettling refugees28. The 
weakness of the EU’s recent resettlement efforts is measured 
against a background of increasing suspicion among Europeans 
towards migration and a rise in populist identity parties. 
Resettlement vs. irregular arrivals
The latest wave of European resettlement emerged in a context 
of crisis when the EU was eager to control unexpected and large 
arrivals of refugees and migrants on the southern shores of the 
continent. Resettlement is one of the tools promoted by the EU 
in a package of policies aiming to address the so-called migration 
crisis, together with the hotspots in Greece and Italy, the relo-
cation scheme, and border controls and partnerships with third 
countries29. Therefore, one may read the rise of resettlement in 
Europe as a migration management tool rather than a durable 
solution for refugees in keeping with UNHCR doctrine. 
Resettlement is part of a narrative. First, orderly and legal 
arrivals of refugees prevent dangerous irregular arrivals. Second, 
resettlement is a sign that the EU is not completely closed to 
refugees despite attempts to seal the borders. Third, resettle-
ment is among the commitments of the EU when engaging in 
negotiations with third countries on the management of migra-
tion flows. The aim of this article is not to discuss these asser-
tions, but they hint at the fact that resettlement is a piece of the 
27 J.A. Thomsen, “Denmark no longer to automatically accept UN refugee quo-
ta”, Reuters, 20 December 2017. The programme has been resumed in 2019 after 
the latest general elections in Denmark. 
28 Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Poland and 
Slovakia did not pledge to resettle refugees under the scheme.
29 For a more exhaustive descriptions of  measures and policies adopted after 
2011, see E. Collet and C. Le Coz, After the Storm: Learning from the EU Response to 
the Migration Crisis, Migration Policy Institute, June 2018. 
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architecture of the new European asylum and immigration pol-
icy, with the prevention of irregular arrivals as one of its goals. 
The cases of the EU-Turkey declaration in March 2016, com-
monly called the EU-Turkey deal, and the increasing coopera-
tion with the Libyan coast guard are examples of how resettle-
ment is used for purposes other than refugee protection. In the 
first case, resettlement is a guarantee for Turkish cooperation 
sweetened with 6 billion euros, visa facilitation and reopening 
of EU membership talks. Regarding the central Mediterranean 
route, disembarkations in Libya should be followed by evacua-
tions of refugees to Niger – and since October 2019 to Rwanda 
– and then resettlement in the EU30. 
Does it matter? What lies behind the rise of resettlement 
programmes should not prevent us from acknowledging that 
more refugees are given the opportunities to make a fresh start 
in Europe. After all, NGOs and UNHCR have long advocated 
for further efforts from European governments. However, by 
restricting resettlement to a European issue, EU Member States 
not to set the foundations for long-term programmes that will 
be implemented beyond the crisis still being felt in Europe. 
In this area, figures count as much if not more than inten-
tions. 24,800 refugees were resettled in the EU as part of EU 
programmes between 2015 and 2017, and 39,000 between 
September 2017 and October 2019 as part of the European 
Commission’s call to receive 50,000 refugees from the Middle 
East and the central Mediterranean route31. It is the highest num-
ber in Europe since the South-East Asian refugee crisis in the late 
1970s. But as mentioned above, resettlement needs have never 
been greater. Statistics show that Europe’s contribution to global 
resettlement has been modest and represents less than 6% of the 
total needs. And the growing involvement of Europeans has not 
30 Between November 2017 and July 2019, 4,400 refugees were evacuated from 
Libya, including 2,900 to Niger. Among the latter, only half  of  them were then 
resettled outside of  Niger.  
31 European Commission, “Recommendation on enhancing legal pathways for 
persons in need of  international protection”, C(2017) 6504, 27 September 2017.
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been able to compensate for the withdrawal of the United States, 
where arrivals have decreased four-fold since 2017. 
Furthermore, European priorities do not extend to popula-
tions who, although less present in irregular arrivals to European 
shores (and hence who draw less attention to themselves) still 
have substantial needs, such as nationals from the Democratic 
Republic of Congo or South Sudan. The challenge of resettle-
ment is also a global issue but in Europe tends to reflect the in-
tra European debate, sometimes losing sight of global priorities. 
Private sponsorship: an increasing pathway to Europe
In Europe, private sponsorship is a flexible concept32 and three 
main approaches seem to have developed. The first is the ex-
tended family reunification-based approach in Germany, Ireland 
and France mainly for Syrian and Iraqi families; the second is 
the Humanitarian Corridors approach in Italy33, France, and 
Belgium, which relies on agreements with receiving States to 
issue a specific number of humanitarian visas; and the third is 
the Resettlement-based approach, consisting of welcoming refu-
gees who are identified and referred by UNHCR to the UK, 
and more recently Germany and Ireland34.
The feasibility study commissioned by the European 
Commission35 analyses the legal and operational feasibility and 
32 Defined as “a public-private partnership between governments, who facilitate 
legal admission for refugees, and private actors, who provide financial, social 
and/or emotional support to admit, receive and settle refugees into the commu-
nity”, see International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC), International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), UNHCR (eds.), Private Sponsorship in Europe. 
Expanding complementary pathways for refugee resettlement, ERN+ Scoping Paper, 
European Resettlement Network, September 2017.
33 “‘Beyond the sea’, first report on Humanitarian Corridor and other safe and 
legal pathways in Italy” Caritas Italiana, 2019.
34 To have an analytical perspective on the issue “Fostering Community 
Sponsorship across Europe”, International Catholic Migration Commission 
(ICMC) Europe and Caritas Europa, 2019.
35 “Feasibility study on sponsorship schemes as a possible pathway to safe chan-
nels for admission to the EU”, European Commission - Directorate-General for 
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added value of EU support to sponsorship programmes. The 
study explores four scenarios, ranging from capacity building 
and financial support to new EU legislation and puts forward 
recommendations for the European Commission to support 
the spread of private sponsorship schemes by increasing fund-
ing opportunities for states and civil society organisations and 
by developing capacity-building tools. 
The moment is thus ripe to adopt resettlement and comple-
mentary pathways that have been demonstrated in practice to 
be effective refugee protection tools, and that European states 
can further develop and expand. In this regard, well-designed 
community sponsorship schemes and a resettlement framework 
can contribute to a considerable increase in the regular admis-
sion of refugees and ensure better integration outcomes and 
more tolerant and welcoming societies. For that to happen, EU 
and national policy makers must seize this opportunity and tap 
into increasing citizens’ desires to proactively contribute to ref-
ugee protection and integration. 
Citizen Mobilisation in France and Italy: 
The Future of Refugee Protection?
The developing private sponsorship initiatives in Europe are ev-
idence that European citizens can adopt a more protection-sen-
sitive stance that counterbalances widespread fears. In light of 
the numbers of resettlement and alternative pathways, they are 
not yet a solution, but citizen mobilisation for refugees is also 
a sign that they might substantially increase as a way to protect 
refugees and not merely provide opportunities for them to ar-
rive in Europe. Numbers matter, of course, but in addition to 
saving lives, legal-channel pathways programmes can initiate a 
positive and constructive dynamic that can benefit all refugees 
and, eventually, host communities alike. 
Migration and Home Affairs Directorate Migration and Protection, 2018.
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Resettlement in rural areas in France: A success story36
Resettlement schemes are often assessed in terms of refugee in-
tegration. Whatever scope is assigned to the concept of integra-
tion, its political impact is important because governments are 
worried about how the population may perceive the presence 
of refugees in society. Yet, although states have full control over 
selection and transfer procedures, integration is a complex pro-
cess which involves a host of decision-making levels and actors, 
including the refugees themselves and the local population, 
since a major driver of integration takes place at the local level. 
Insofar as resettlement involves an inflow of refugees which is 
planned in advance, it is possible to pre-empt problems such 
as accommodation, health, education and training opportuni-
ties. This also means that resettlement can be a testing ground 
for new forms of cooperation between the various institutional, 
civil and economic components of society. 
This is what is happening right now with the implementa-
tion of resettlement programmes in France. Although it has a 
long history in France37, resettlement has only become a key 
component of French asylum policy since 2015. In the wake of 
the EU Council’s decision of 20 July 2015 and the EU-Turkey 
“deal”, France committed to receive 10,000 refugees from the 
Middle East38. The government formed after the spring 2017 
elections renewed France’s commitment. In October 2017, 
President Macron announced the resettlement of 10,000 
refugees by autumn 2019 as part of the European Commission’s 
36 This section is based on a research carried out in France for International 
Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) Europe in the framework of  the SHARE 
INTEGRATION project. See M. Tardis, Another Story from the ‘Refugee Crisis’. 
Resettlement in Small Towns and Rural Areas in France, Études de l’Ifri, July 2019. 
37 From the Hungarians in 1956 to South-East Asian refugees in the 1970s and 
1980s, France has contributed to international efforts to share responsibility. But 
resettlement vanished in the 1980s. In 2008, a framework agreement was signed 
between the French government and UNHCR including a commitment to about 
100 resettlement cases per year. 
38 Of  which only 1,965 arrived according to the European Commission figures. 
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new call in September 201739. The targets were split between 
Syrian refugees from the Middle East (7,000 people) and ref-
ugees coming via the central Mediterranean route (3,000 peo-
ple). This programme has led to the arrivals of 9,233 refugees as 
of 31 October 2019. France has become the largest resettlement 
country in Europe and is planning to launch a new resettlement 
programme for 2020-2021. 
The expansion of resettlement in France has encouraged the 
authorities to provide a placement policy for refugees. Tensions 
regarding the reception of migrant populations in large cities 
made it necessary to rethink and improve distribution across 
France. This is how small towns have gradually become recep-
tion areas for refugees. 
This trend finds its roots in the dispersal of migrants living 
in camps in Calais and Paris. In 2015, the government decided 
to hastily open around a hundred temporary accommodation 
centres that played a key part in the final dismantling of the 
Calais camp that had housed nearly 10,000 people in October 
2016. These centres mainly opened in small towns and rural ar-
eas where cheap accommodation and free buildings were avail-
able. Although some signs of hostility and political opposition 
emerged, they were generally limited. Conversely, a strong show 
of support was observed from the population mobilised to help 
these migrants. These groups of volunteers are still active. They 
paved the way for resettled refugees. The government figured 
out that small towns and rural areas would become safe haven 
for refugees in France and put in place a dispersal mechanism to 
address the high flows of arrivals of resettled refugees. 
Refugees are facing specific challenges in these areas. 
Although housing is widely available and suitable for large fam-
ilies, refugees can suffer of isolation and lack of transportation, 
fewer healthcare services and a lack of French classes for adults 
and adolescents. Nevertheless, for each of these aspects, the lack 
39 Le Monde, “Macron s’engage à accueillir 10,000 réfugiés d’ici à 2019”, 9 October 
2017.
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of specific programmes has been overcome by mobilising local 
communities and the existence of solidarity networks. In that 
respect, the visibility of refugees has proved to be a positive 
asset for their local integration. It has also belied the assump-
tion that small towns and rural areas are suspicious of ethnic 
diversity, conservative, and opposed to globalisation, of which 
immigrants are portrayed as a symptom. 
This strong citizen solidarity, along with better communi-
cation among local stakeholders compared to urban areas, 
emphasises that rural areas are lands of opportunities for ref-
ugees. Indeed, they are a powerful driver for integration. For 
example, access to work is facilitated by strong social networks. 
Volunteers are often making the connection between refugees 
and employers in dire need of a labour force in areas where the 
local population is ageing and outsiders are difficult to attract. 
Thus, refugees avoid ordinary recruitment processes, which can 
be disadvantageous or discriminatory for them. 
Moreover, refugees quickly become members of the local 
communities despite cultural, religious and language differenc-
es. Because volunteers are very present in the refugees’ lives, 
they help transfer the cultural and social codes of French society 
which make integration possible, i.e. “these little things” cannot 
be taught in a classroom in the framework of any reception 
and integration programme. Local communities help refugees 
to build a sense of belonging to their new host society and pave 
the way to long-term integration in France. 
Humanitarian corridors in Italy: 
An effective civil mobilisation 
“Humanitarian Corridors” is the recipient of the 2019 Nansen 
Refugee Award, awarded by the UNCHCR to individuals or 
organisations which distinguish themselves by the support 
they provide to the world’s refugees. Behind the “Corridors”, 
which have enabled more than 2,600 people to be brought 
safely and legally to Italy, lies a huge amount of work by local 
communities engaged in welcoming migrants. Integration is 
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achieved at the local level, and according to research conduct-
ed by Caritas Italiana40 there are three main factors that play a 
role in its success: the presence of a host community, families 
and volunteers around the beneficiaries to facilitate social in-
tegration, housing and work placement (an average of 12 peo-
ple for each reception and 60% presence of tutor families are 
active alongside the beneficiaries within the Caritas network 
for Humanitarian Corridors).
The second point are the beneficiaries themselves, who are 
mostly families, reflecting the composition of the vast majority 
of the refugee population worldwide. As such, they are more in 
harmony with the local communities and help dismantle the 
media stereotype on arrivals by sea, where single men are preva-
lent due to the hardships of the journey. Even if beneficiaries of 
humanitarian corridors are predominantly vulnerable people, as 
it is a criterion of the protocol with the Government for their in-
clusion, the opportunity of enjoying a personalised model of re-
ception offers them a way to eventually emancipate themselves. 
Finally, the accompaniment that the national organisations 
carry out with tutorship and economic support is fundamental 
for the success of local projects.
Four elements of the Italian experience  are good practices 
that can be scaled up:
• Pre-departure preparation of the beneficiaries, which is 
provided directly by the organisations engaged in recep-
tion, and which helps level expectations; and pre-arriv-
al orientation of the local communities who will host 
refugees.
• Communities that are willing to help can be activated 
if awareness-raising work is done before arrival, and this 
action normally results in solidarity and understanding. 
As regards the Caritas network involved in humanitarian 
corridors, training meetings were held before the arrival 
of the beneficiaries in over 85% of the areas involved.
40 Caritas Italiana (2019).
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• The Italian experience took care to find good matches 
between the beneficiaries of the programme and their 
host communities. Although the project in which ben-
eficiaries are placed is the same throughout Italy and 
follows the same criteria, local peculiarities must be 
taken into account for a better integration. It is neces-
sary to find the right match between the opportunities 
provided by the host community and the needs of the 
beneficiaries, and let the parties involved know the des-
tination before departure.
• NGOs, public institutions and local organisations work 
closely together to select beneficiaries, sharing informa-
tion and dividing responsibilities. This increases the 
complexity of the process, but in addition to ensuring 
its transparency, it allows the organisations that will be 
in charge of hosting the beneficiaries to be well aware 
of the contexts of the refugees’ origin and to carry out 
a selection based the objective criteria of vulnerability 
and the possibility of reception. In this way the process 
as a whole acquires sustainability.
What Can We Learn from Citizen Mobilisation?
Many citizens have demonstrated the ability to grasp the inher-
ent limits of restrictive immigration policies and the potential 
associated with regular migration. Citizen and local commu-
nity involvement should characterise every selection process in 
order to arrive at a new governance of the phenomenon.
There is in fact a lot to learn from the experiences of rural 
areas in France and humanitarian corridors in Italy. Citizen 
involvement in integrating refugees has proved to be an ef-
fective model. It can mark a turning point in how European 
states receive and include refugees into their societies. Since 
the 1990s, and with the increasing complexity of asylum and 
social policies, receiving and assisting asylum seekers and ref-
ugees has progressively become the exclusive province of civil 
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servants, professional social workers, and lawyers. Citizens 
and local communities provide additional value that should 
be taken into account in shaping policies and scaling-up safe 
and legal channels in the future. Together with the private 
sector, they are creating the pathway for successful long-term 
integration. Citizen participation also provides an opportuni-
ty for a more open and welcoming society. In France, for ex-
ample, concerns regarding religion, and more specifically, the 
Islamic veil, which often exist before the arrival of the refu-
gees, very quickly disappear after their arrival. These concerns 
give way to a curiosity about the newcomers’ culture and, 
sometimes, to a willingness to learn the refugees’ languages.  
Citizen mobilisation might be an attractive model for gov-
ernments. At first sight, it can be perceived as an opportunity 
for authorities to lower costs by outsourcing the reception and 
integration of newcomers to volunteers and willing citizens. 
But governments should think twice before embarking on 
this path. Participation means that citizens are more aware 
of the realities of migrants and thus, of the paradoxes of cur-
rent asylum and immigration policies in Europe. Hospitality 
will not be targeted only to resettled or sponsored refugees. 
Supporting hospitality might be at odds with the growing at-
tacks on civil society members helping migrants at sea or at 
the borders.  
Finally, the reception of resettled refugees in rural areas 
questions how challenges by refugees and to a larger extent 
by migrants are framed. Many of the obstacles to refugee inte-
gration in small towns and rural areas affect local populations 
as well. Mobility and access to health and social services are 
also concerns for French and Italian nationals living in these 
areas. Likewise, access to housing is a common challenge for 
most inhabitants of large cities. Notwithstanding the specif-
ic needs and vulnerabilities of refugees, many of these issues 
should not be perceived solely as “immigration problems”. 
Instead, they present an opportunity to depart from the “us” 
versus “them” paradigm. And they also present a challenge to 
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policy makers that might find it less complex to promote re-
strictive reception policies and polarisation of public opinion 
rather than addressing the social inequalities within European 
societies.  
 
5.  The Future of Irregular Migration 
     to Europe
 Eugenio Cusumano
Attempts to develop predictive models of large-scale population 
mobility can be found since the beginning of migration studies. 
Scholars have attempted to forecast the size of migratory flows 
by conceptualising large-scale human mobility as the combina-
tion of negative factors prompting people to leave their home-
land (economic hardship, conflict, human rights violations, 
etc.) and positive incentives to choose a specific destination. 
These are usually referred to as the “push” and “pull” factors 
of migration1. More recent studies, however, have contested 
the very possibility to predict migration through deterministic 
models, criticising the dichotomy between push and pull fac-
tors as overly simplistic2.
These warnings are especially applicable to the study of mi-
gration across the Mediterranean. Over the last decades, sea-
borne human mobility between Africa and Southern Europe 
has consisted of both economic migrants and refugees coming 
from sub-Saharan Africa, the Maghreb, and the Middle East. 
The complexity of these mixed flows does not only challenge 
1 N. Van Hear, O. Bakewell Oliver, and K. Long, “Push-pull plus: reconsidering 
the drivers of  migration”, Journal of  Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 44, no. 6, 
2018, pp. 927-944.
2 A. Geddes and P. Scholten, The Politics of  Migration and Immigration in Europe, 
London,  Sage, 2016; S. Castles, H. de Haas, and M. Miller,  The Age of  Migration, 
New York, Guilfold Press, 2013.
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the dichotomy between economic migration and forced dis-
placement, magnifying the difficulties and dilemmas attached 
to European policy responses. The complex patchwork of mo-
tivations, origins, and legal status of seaborne migrants, com-
bined with the geopolitical and socioeconomic complexity of 
the wider Mediterranean region, belies any attempt to accurate-
ly forecast the future of irregular seaborne migration to Europe. 
These caveats notwithstanding, this chapter will attempt to 
unravel some key trends in irregular maritime migration across 
the Mediterranean Sea, focusing on the Central Mediterranean 
route connecting Libya and Tunisia to Italy. Although a precise 
forecast of the future of seaborne migration is ultimately im-
possible, a survey of the existing literature and a historical ex-
amination of migratory flows across the Mediterranean over the 
last thirty years may nevertheless help identify some plausible 
future prospects. To this end, this chapter is divided as follows. 
The first section provides an overview of seaborne migration 
across the Mediterranean Sea, thereby identifying some of the 
key dynamics that have shaped irregular maritime in the past 
decades. The second section zooms into seaborne migration in 
the wake of the Arab uprisings, conducting a more in-depth ex-
amination of the Central Mediterranean corridor in the period 
between 2013 and 2019. The last section end ensuing conclu-
sions will take stock of the evidence sketched out in the previ-
ous two sections to identify some future trends that may affect 
migration across the Mediterranean. 
Irregular Seaborne Migration to Italy: An Overview
Maritime human mobility is inextricably linked with the histo-
ry of the Mediterranean region. Since at least the mid-XX cen-
tury, population flows across the Mediterranean basin were far 
from solely northbound, as epitomised by Spanish, French and 
Italian settlements in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya3. 
3 C. Mainwaring, At Europe’s Edge, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2019.
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Irregular maritime mobility from North Africa and the Middle 
East only started to become significant since the 1970s, as 
tightening visa restrictions significantly reduced the possibility 
of legal entry for temporary migrant workers4. Up until 2001, 
the largest irregular migration corridor to Italy was the Adriatic 
Sea. Seaborne mobility across the Otranto Channel reached 
dramatic proportions in 1991 and 1997-98, when the collapse 
of the Communist regime and a new wave of unrest in Albania 
and Kosovo prompted tens of thousands to migrate to Italy. On 
7 March 1991, over 27,000 landed in a single day, prompting 
Italian authorities to launch a naval blockade to intercept the 
ships carrying irregular migrants. Towards the end of the 1990s, 
the Southern coast of Sicily became the largest destination of 
seaborne migrants, who largely crossed the strait of Sicily from 
Tunisia. As Tunis started criminalising illegal exit, Libya also 
became a transit as well as a destination country. Between 1997 
and 2008, seaborne migration from Libya and Tunisia oscillat-
ed between around 30,000 and 15,000 every year5.
Italy attempted to reduce irregular crossings through readmis-
sion and border control cooperation with both North African 
countries. Tripoli’s abysmal human rights record and democrat-
ic credentials make externalisation agreements with Libya espe-
cially contentious. Notwithstanding ethical dilemmas and legal 
constraints, then Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi and Libya’s 
autocratic leader Muammar Gaddafi signed the 2008 Treaty on 
Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation. In the attempt to fos-
ter cooperation between the two countries, Italy agreed to pay 
up to five billion euros and contribute to building Libyan in-
frastructure. Cooperation in managing irregular migration fea-
tures especially prominently in the Treaty, where the two parties 
committed to patrolling Libyan shores through boats provided 
4 P. Fargues, Four Decades of  Cross-Mediterranean Undocumented Migration to Europe, 
UK AID and International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2017.
5 M. Baldwin-Edwards and D. Lutterbeck, “Coping with the Libyan migration 
crisis”, Journal of  Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 45, no. 12, 2019, pp. 2241-2257; 
P. Fargues (2017).
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by Italy and manned by joint crews6. While problematic on hu-
manitarian grounds, Rome’s collaboration with Gaddafi played 
a significant role in reducing irregular departures, and remained 
in place until the start of Libya’s civil war in 2011, when Italy 
joined the bandwagon of NATO partners who supported the 
rebels through the aerial bombing mission Unified Protector7.
Fig. 5.1 -  Irregular sea arrivals in Italy, 1998-2010
Source: International Organization for Migration 
and the Italian Ministry of the Interior
 
6 N. Ronzitti,  “The Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation between 
Italy and Libya: New Prospects for Cooperation in the Mediterranean?”, Bulletin 
of  Italian Politics, vol. 1, no. 1, 2009, pp. 125-33.
7 M.  Villa and A. Varvelli, “Libya: From Regime Change to State-Building”, 
in E. Cusumano and S. Hofmaier, Projecting Resilience Across the Mediterranean, 
Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2019; M. Baldwin-Edwards and D. Lutterbeck (2019); 
E. Steinhilper and R. Gruijters, “A Contested Crisis: Policy Narratives and 
Empirical Evidence on Border Deaths in the Mediterranean”, Sociology, 2018, 
DOI 10.31235/osf.io/dn7a5. 
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Irregular Seaborne Migration 
After the Arab Uprisings
Policy-makers and scholars working on migration across the 
Mediterranean have identified three main avenues to Europe: 
the Eastern Mediterranean route connecting Turkey to Greece 
and Cyprus, the Central Mediterranean route leading from 
Libya and Tunisia to Italy, and the Western Mediterranean 
route from Morocco to Spain. Although alternative avenues 
like the Eastern Atlantic route from West Africa to the Canary 
Islands or longer journeys across the Mediterranean leading 
directly from Algeria to Sardinia and the Balearic islands and 
from Turkey and Egypt to Southern Italy have sometimes been 
used, the majority of crossings have occurred along the three 
above-mentioned corridors8.
As illustrated by Figure 5.2 above, Italy did not always 
serve as the main entry point to Europe. In 2015, the Eastern 
Mediterranean route became the largest irregular migratory av-
enue by far. This sudden spike of irregular arrivals across the 
Aegean was dictated by a sudden increase in the magnitude of 
the flow caused by the civil war in Syria, but also by the estab-
lishment of tighter controls and a border fence at the land bor-
der between Turkey and Greece, which prompted migrants and 
smuggling organisations to opt for irregular seaborne crossings. 
As a result of the March 2016 agreement between the European 
Union and Turkey, however, crossings from Turkey to Greece 
decreased drastically, but did not cease altogether. 
8 Frontex, Risk analysis for 2017; Frontex, Risk analysis for 2018; Frontex, Risk 
analysis for 2019; P. Fargues (2017).
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Fig. 5.2 - Migrant arrivals along the Western, Central 
and Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Routes 
after the Arab Uprisings
Source: International Organization for Migration
Contrary to predictions, the near-closure of the Eastern route 
did not trigger a meaningful increase in irregular migration 
from Libya. Since the summer of 2017, as Libyan militias start-
ed to detain migrants for longer rather than sending them at 
sea, the Central Mediterranean too lost part of its significance 
as an irregular migratory avenue, eventually becoming less trav-
elled than both the Eastern and Western routes. The Central 
Mediterranean corridor, however, has remained the deadliest 
of migratory avenues to European and worldwide. Between 
2014 and 2019, over 15,000 reported casualties occurred off 
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the coast of Libya. Although casualties decreased significant-
ly since the 2016 peak, when over 4,500 deaths occurred, the 
deadliness of the crossing has only further increased, reaching a 
ratio of 1 casualty every 5 departures. As of 25 November 2019, 
740 reported deaths have occurred off the coast of Libya9. 
Fig. 5.3 - Casualties along the Western, Central and 
Eastern Mediterranean Routes
Source: International Organization for Migration Missing Migrants Project
Irregular Seaborne Migration Along the 
Central Mediterranean Route, 2013-2019
Although Gaddafi attempted to deter Italy and other NATO 
countries from intervening by threatening to “turn Europe 
black”)10, irregular migrant crossings across the Central 
9 International Organization for Migration (IOM), Missing Migrants Project, 2019.
10 K. Greenhill, “Migration as a Weapon. in Theory and in Practice”, Military 
Review, November/December, 2016.
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Mediterranean did not skyrocket immediately in the wake of 
the uprisings and NATO’s military intervention. While a first, 
smaller spike in irregular departures already occurred in 2011, 
when 62,000 reached Italy by sea from both Libya and Tunisia, 
irregular departures increased dramatically only in late 2013. 
Owing to the collapse of state institutions in the midst of the 
civil war, Libya became an ideal hub for human smugglers and 
irregular migration to Europe11. 
In the meantime, the border enforcement practices devised 
by Italy to deter irregular migration had not only been nullified 
by the collapse of Gaddafi’s regime, but also challenged on legal 
grounds by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). In 
the seminal 2012 Hirsi decision, the ECHR found Italian Navy 
personnel guilty of returning Eritrean asylum seekers rescued at 
sea in 2009 to Libya. This pushback amounted to a violation of 
the non-refoulement principle, which forbids the pushing back 
refugees to countries where their fundamental rights would be 
threatened12. 
The Italian government then decided to review its border 
control policies by disembarking all the migrants rescued at sea 
on its territory. In late 2013, in the wake of two widely pub-
licised shipwrecks off the island of Lampedusa, Italy launched 
operation Mare Nostrum, which involved 34 Navy warships op-
erating off the coast of Libya on a rotation basis13.  Frustrated 
by the costs of the operation, Italy hoped to leverage on the up-
coming European Council presidency to obtain burden shar-
ing from the rest of the European Union. Far from backing 
Italy, however, other EU Member States criticised the Italian 
Navy operation as a pull factor of irregular migration and “a 
11 A. Al-Arabi, Local specificities of  migration in Libya: challenges and solutions, European 
University Institute Robert Schuman Centre, Policy Brief  4, 2018; M. Baldwin-
Edwards and D. Lutterbeck (2019);  P. Fargues (2017).
12 V. Moreno-Lax and E. Papastavridis  (eds.), Boat Refugees and Migrants at Sea: a 
Comprehensive Approach, Leiden, Brill, 2016.
13 A. Patalano, “NightMare nostrum? Not quite”, RUSI Journal, vol. 160, no. 3, 
2015, pp. 14-19.
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bridge to Europe”14. The compromise reached by the European 
Council led to a suspension of Mare Nostrum, to be followed by 
a smaller-scale mission conducted by Frontex, named Triton. 
Accordingly, Triton was conceived as a border control rather 
than a rescue mission, initially patrolling a much smaller area 
than Mare Nostrum15. In the spring of 2015, another EU mil-
itary mission – the EUNAVFOR MED operation “Sophia” – 
was launched under the framework of the Common Security 
and Defence Policy (CSDP). EUNAVFOR MED too, focused 
on “disrupting smugglers” networks’, does not explicitly men-
tion the conduct of maritime search and rescue operations in its 
mandate. As illustrated by Figure 5.3, Triton and EUNAVFOR 
MED’s personnel duly complied with the moral and legal obli-
gation to rescue, assisting over 138,000 people in total. The fear 
of becoming a pull factor, however, limited European assets’ 
involvement in rescue operations, creating a gap in SAR capa-
bilities that was bridged by civil society organisations.
Started in the summer of 2014 with the creation of the 
Migrant Offshore Aid Station, non-governmental rescue op-
erations gained momentum over the following years. In both 
2016 and 2017, a total of 10 different NGOs operated in the 
Central Mediterranean, deploying between 12 and 14 ships off 
the Libyan coast. Despite the limited capabilities of most char-
ities, NGOs became the largest provider of maritime rescue, 
assisting over 115,000 migrants in total16. 
14 M. Riddervold and R.-L. Bosilca, Not so Humanitarian After All? Assessing EU 
Naval Mission Sophia, ARENA Working Paper, 2017, p. 9.
15 E. Cusumano, “Straightjacketing migrant rescuers? The code of  conduct on 
maritime NGOs”,  Mediterranean Politics, vol. 24, no. 1, 2018, pp. 106-114; S. 
Carrera and L. den Hertog, “Whose Mare? Rule of  law challenges in the field of  
European border surveillance in the Mediterranean”, CEPS, Liberty and Security 
in Europe, no. 79, January 2015. 
16 E. Cusumano, “Humanitarians at Sea: Selective emulation across migrant 
rescue NGOs in the Mediterranean”, Contemporary Security Policy, 2019, DOI 
10.1080/13523260.2018.1558879;  P. Cuttitta, “ Repoliticization Through Search 
and Rescue? Humanitarian NGOs and Migration Management in the Central 
Mediterranean”, Geopolitics, vol. 23, no. 3, 2018, pp. 632-660.
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Fig. 5.4 - Rescues in the Central Mediterranean 
per organisation in absolute terms, 2014-2018
Source: author’s elaborations on Italian Coast Guard and UNHCR data.
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Since early 2017, however, NGOs’ activities have faced mount-
ing criticism. Frontex’s accusation that NGOs were acting as 
a pull factor was tapped into by Italian politicians and pros-
ecutors. First asked to sign a Code of Conduct limiting their 
activities in 2017, NGOs were explicitly prohibited from dis-
embarking rescued migrants in Italian ports in 201817. In ad-
dition, a 2019 security decree allows for prescribing large fines 
and the confiscation of ships entering Italian territorial waters 
without authorisation18. Throughout the same period, various 
NGOs were investigated by Italian courts, which apprehended 
three ships.
In late 2019, the formation of a new government and the 
tentative agreement on the redistribution of migrants res-
cued at sea reached in Valletta between Italy, Malta, France 
and Germany slightly softened Rome’s stance. However, Italy 
and other European governments’ approach to NGOs did not 
change significantly. The willingness to facilitate the activities of 
the Libyan Coast Guard and the concerns that SAR operations 
acted as a pull factor has translated into a persisting willingness 
to restrain NGOs’ activities. Indeed, the draft of the September 
2017 Valletta summit conclusions restates the limitations on 
NGOs activities enacted by the 2017 Code of Conduct, im-
plicitly reiterating the critique that unregulated rescue opera-
tions incentivize departures19. 
Due to this ongoing criminalisation process, NGOs’ involve-
ment in SAR has shrunk drastically. At the moment of writing, 
the only charities operating off the coast of Libya are MSF and 
SOS-Méditerranée, operating jointly aboard the Ocean Viking, 
17 E. Cusumano and K. Gombeer, “In deep waters: The legal, humanitarian and 
political implications of  closing Italian ports to migrant rescuers”, Mediterranean 
Politics, 2018,  DOI: 10.1080/13629395.2018.1532145;  E. Cusumano (2018). 
18 S. Carrera and R. Cortinovis , Search and Rescue, Disembarkation and Relocation 
Arrangements in the Mediterranean: Sailing Away from Responsibility?, CEPS 
Paper, 2019-10, 2019.
19 A. Camilli, “Un nuovo codice Minniti europeo per le ong?” (“A new European 
Minniti-code for the ONG”), Internazionale, 25 September 2019.
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and the two Spanish charities Open Arms and Aita Mari. 
Critics have used the rough overlap between plummeting de-
partures from Libya, the decreasing number of casualties, and 
NGOs’ reduced presence to illustrate the alleged effectiveness 
of policies aimed at disincentivising maritime rescue. Recent 
research, however, shows that the activities of NGOs did not 
significantly affect migratory flows from 2014 until November 
2019. Far from being influenced by the pull effect of NGOs 
and other rescue assets’ presence, migratory flows from Libya 
were mainly affected by weather conditions and developments 
on land20.
Libyan institutions and tribes’ renewed efforts to curb ille-
gal departures played an especially crucial role. In 2017, then 
Interior Minister Marco Minniti launched a new approach to 
migration management, offering financial support to Libyan 
tribes and militias in exchange for cooperation in containing 
irregular departures across the Mediterranean. Since 2016, 
the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) Navy and 
Coast Guard, trained by Operation Sofia and Italian Navy and 
Coast Guard personnel, has also started to conduct its own 
rescue operations, intercepting migrant boats and taking them 
back to Libya. From 2016 to November 2019, over 50,000 
migrants were brought back to Libya. However, the ill-pre-
paredness of this newly-formed force and the unwillingness of 
many migrants to be taken back resulted into several incidents, 
ranging from the intimidation of NGOs to the use of violence 
against and the abandonment at sea of migrants in the course 
of rescue operations21.
20 E. Cusumano and M. Villa, Sea rescue NGOs: a pull factor of  irregular migration?, 
European University Institute, Policy Brief  22/19, 2019, DOI 10.2870/644458; 
C. Heller and  L. Pezzani, Blaming the Rescuers. Criminalizing Solidarity, Reinforcing 
Deterrence. Forensic Architecture Agency, Goldsmiths, University of  London, 2018.
21 V. Moreno-Lax and M. Lemberg-Pedersen, “Border-induced displacement: 
The ethical and legal implications of  distance-creation through externalization”, 
Questions of  International Law, vol. 56, 2019, pp. 5-33.
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Future Prospects on Irregular Seaborne Migration 
to Europe
While the multiplicity of drivers, enablers and obstacles to hu-
man mobility across the Mediterranean precludes the possibili-
ty of accurately forecasting irregular migration to Europe, some 
crucial future trends can nevertheless be identified.
First, demographic, geopolitical and environmental factors 
suggest that migration across the Mediterranean is going to 
continue and may inevitably increase in absolute numbers due 
to population growth in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle 
East. Overly pessimistic predictions of a large increase in mi-
grant departures, however, are unwarranted. Contrary to com-
mon wisdom, migratory flows primarily occur along South-
South rather than northbound corridors, and a large majority 
of migrants and refugees tend to remain in neighbouring coun-
tries. Such dynamics will continue to affect population mobili-
ty across sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East in the foresee-
able future, indirectly contributing to reducing migratory flows 
to Europe. 
While human mobility to Europe may increase in absolute 
numbers in the long term, the large-scale flows that occurred 
in the wake of the Arab uprisings in 2011 are likely to remain 
unmatched in the short to medium term. Since 2017, irregular 
migration has steadily reduced, decreasing by 27% in 2018. 
Although small increases in arrivals have been reported along 
the main migratory routes in the second half of 2019, these 
have not reversed the downwards trend. As of 21 November 
2019, 90,744 people crossed the Mediterranean compared 
to the 108,146 irregular entries that occurred in the first 11 
months of 2018. Such trajectories are unlikely to significantly 
change in the short term. Future unrest in countries of depar-
ture and, to a lesser extent, transit states currently cooperating 
with the EU in stopping migratory flows, may nevertheless trig-
ger new spikes in northbound migration.
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Relatedly, the seaborne migratory flow from Libya to Italy is 
likely to remain much smaller than during the 2013-2017 peak 
for various reasons. As amply demonstrated by academic re-
search, the majority of migrants do not travel to Libya with the 
goal of reaching Europe. A strong currency and a large availa-
bility of low-skilled jobs continues to make Libya an attractive 
destination country22. This situation is unlikely to change, and 
may further consolidate if the country grows more stable. To be 
sure, as epitomised by the small increase in crossings in the wake 
of general Haftar’s offensive against Tripoli in April 2019, new 
outbreaks in hostilities may prompt migrants to escape Libya, 
thereby affecting irregular departures. Higher local instability 
in combination with EU initiatives at Mali and Niger’s borders, 
may simultaneously act as a restraint on the number of migrants 
who travel to Libya in the first place. Indeed, irregular border 
crossings from Niger to Libya appear to have shrunk drastically 
in 2018 and 201923. Lastly, as shown by the persistent drop 
in irregular crossings since July 2017, concerted action by the 
EU has succeeded in curbing crossings and is unlikely to face 
any major overhaul despite mounting evidence of widespread 
human rights violations. Over the next few years, short of any 
currently unforeseeable developments like a major outbreak in 
hostilities or a collapse of Tripoli’s GNA, the combined effects 
of reduced arrivals and Libyan authorities heavy-handed collab-
oration in stemming the flow will keep irregular crossings lower 
than in 2014-2017.
Migration across the Mediterranean will continue to be 
shaped primarily by push rather than pull factors. Existing 
research has already downplayed the influence of pull factors, 
22 S. McMahon and N. Sigona, “Navigating the Central Mediterranean in a Time 
of  ‘Crisis’ Disentangling Migration Governance and Migrant Journeys”, Sociology, 
27 March 2018.
23  UNHCR, Operational Portal Refugee Situations, “Mediterranean Situation”, 
2019; UNHCR, Routes Towards the Mediterranean, UNHCR Appeal, June 2019; 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Global Study on Smuggling 
of  Migrants, 2018.
The Future of Irregular Migration to Europe 115
forcefully showing that the factors compelling migrants to leave 
their homeland play a much more important role than the ben-
efits endowed by destination countries24 or the alleged incentive 
provided by NGOs’ maritime rescue operations25. This is espe-
cially true for mobility to Europe, which will continue to con-
sist of a mixed flow spanning the dichotomy between econom-
ic and forced migration, posing new challenges to European 
asylum and humanitarian protection policies. Extreme poverty, 
conflict and unrest in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, 
as well as population growth and environmental degradation in 
most countries in these regions, will remain the main driving 
force underlying northbound population flows. As acknowl-
edged by European authorities, climate change in particular is 
set to dwarf all other drivers of migration26. The asylum and 
border control policies devised by Italy and other European 
countries, on the other hand, are only likely to have a minor 
and ultimately negligible impact on the magnitude of the flow.
The only activities that will continue to play a significant 
role in curbing the flow along a specific route are contain-
ment measures physically preventing migrants from reaching 
European shores. As epitomised by the above-mentioned Hirsi 
decision, however, international law prevents European securi-
ty forces from pushing back asylum seekers to most countries at 
the Southern end of the Mediterranean basin. Public demands 
to curb irregular migration will continue to prompt European 
governments to rely on externalisation policies in order to cir-
cumvent such legal constraints, using bilateral agreements and 
European instruments like the European Neighbourhood and 
European development policy to co-opt transit countries into 
stopping migrants from reaching the EU’s external borders. 
24 L. Mayblin, “Complexity reduction and policy consensus: Asylum seekers, the 
right to work, and the ‘pull factor’ thesis in the UK context”, The British Journal of  
Politics and International Relations, vol. 18, no. 4, 2016, pp. 812-828.
25 E. Cusumano and M. Villa (2019).
26 F. Natale, S. Migali, and R. MÜnz, Many more to come? Migration from and within 
Africa, European Commission, 2018.
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Such arrangements are likely to prove resilient to major human 
rights concerns. Externalisation policies, however, are hardly a 
silver bullet. Besides being ethically problematic and vulnerable 
to judicial review by the European Court of Human Rights, 
these measures are also weakened by institutional fragility and 
widespread corruption in countries of transit and departure, 
which may suddenly make local authorities unwilling or un-
able to cooperate. Moreover, the EU’s growing willingness to 
curb migratory flows is likely to be exploited by countries in its 
Southern Neighbourhood, which will use their ability to hin-
der or enable migratory flows as a bargaining chip in order to 
obtain financial aid and other concessions. Repatriation agree-
ments facilitating the expulsion of illegal migrants to countries 
of departure will also be stepped up. The effectiveness of these 
measures, however, is bound to remain modest due to both le-
gal and practical constraints as well as the limited willingness to 
cooperate displayed by countries of return, which often find in 
migrants’ remittances a larger source of revenues than develop-
ment aid. Arrangements allowing for the immediate, forcible 
repatriation of migrants upon arrival, like Italian and European 
partnerships with Tunisia, have played and will keep playing 
a more significant role. As epitomised by the recent increase 
in crossings from Tunisia to Italy in 2018 and 2019, however, 
such measures too face limitations, and may not suffice to deter 
irregular departures when unrest in countries of origin grows. 
European maritime border control policies will continue to 
juggle between the moral and legal imperative to rescue lives and 
the fear of facilitating illegal crossings. While recent research has 
called into question the extent to which rescue operations are a 
pull factors, such policy narratives tend to be extremely resilient 
even when not corroborated by existing evidence27. Accordingly, 
state-led rescue missions are unlikely to be launched again in the 
near future. While not playing a significant role in affecting the 
magnitude of migratory flows, maritime border enforcement 
27 L. Mayblin (2016). 
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and rescue missions like Mare Nostrum can both rescue lives 
and funnel migratory flows, thereby detecting irregular arriv-
als at risk of criminal and terrorist infiltration. Nevertheless, 
the fear of causing a pull factor and being perceived by public 
opinion as “soft” on migration is likely to continue to discour-
age EU governments from launching border control missions 
with a significant maritime rescue component. Although occa-
sional, widely publicised news of migrant drownings may cause 
outrage and prompt demand for action, European maritime 
border control policies will continue to suffer from the uneasy 
coexistence of humanitarian imperatives and deterrence strat-
egies. In the period between 2014 and 2017, civil society has 
at least partly bridged the gap arising from the disengagement 
of EU military assets from the Southern Mediterranean, there-
by contributing to mitigating the loss of life at sea. Although 
NGOs have proven resilient to criminalisation, their involve-
ment in maritime rescue is set to remain more limited than 
in previous years. As I showed in my previous research, the 
proliferation of NGOs off the coast of Libya that occurred in 
2014-2016 stemmed from the convergence of a number of ena-
bling conditions, including the perceived legitimacy, feasibility 
and financial viability of non-governmental migrant rescue28. 
These conditions are unlikely to obtain in the foreseeable fu-
ture. Even if the charges of abetting illegal immigration pressed 
against several organisations are likely to be waived in light of 
NGOs’ humanitarian motives, this criminalisation campaign 
has largely compromised the perceived legitimacy of these or-
ganisations in public opinion, causing a drop in donations and 
strong media opposition. Higher risk of being prosecuted for 
abetting illegal immigration, delays in providing NGOs with 
a place of disembarkation, the fact that the Italian MRCC no 
longer serves as a source of situational awareness, and the tense 
relationship with Libyan coast guards – which has frequently 
28 E. Cusumano, “Straightjacketing Migrant Rescuers? The Code of  Conduct on 
Maritime NGOs”, Mediterranean Politics, vol. 24, no. 4, 2017, pp. 106-114.
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threatened violence against humanitarian workers – have inev-
itably hindered the feasibility and effectiveness of NGO rescue 
operations. Despite criticism, the EU is likely to both refrain 
from directly conducting proactive rescue missions in inter-
national waters and discourage civil society conducting these 
tasks. Indeed, rescue operations will continue to be delegated 
to third countries’ security forces like the GNA Coast Guard 
and Navy, which can merge rescue and interdiction by taking 
migrants back to Southern Mediterranean shores.
Without systematic efforts to tackle the root causes of migra-
tion, externalisation measures and immediate repatriation will 
also continue to be at risk of incentivising human smugglers 
and traffickers to redirect flows towards riskier routes and strat-
egies in order to avoid detection. As shown by variations in mi-
grant crossings along the main Mediterranean routes over the 
previous years, migratory routes to Europe are only indirectly 
connected to each other. As a result, sudden variations in the 
porousness of some specific European borders will not deter-
mine sudden, large-scale rerouting across the Western, Central, 
and Eastern routes. However, migratory flows along specific 
routes will remain adaptive to specific externalisation and bor-
der control measures. The reshuffling of Eastern Mediterranean 
flows from land to sea – as well as migrants’ attempt to reach 
Spain through longer routes leading to farther locations includ-
ing the Canary and Balearic islands – are a case in point. 
Relatedly, externalisation policies will continue to have se-
vere humanitarian side effects. This is especially true for the 
Central Mediterranean. The ill-preparedness of Libyan mari-
time forces, the fragility of the state institutions to which they 
are accountable, and the very nature of their operations – more 
akin to interception than rescue and thus often resisted by mi-
grants – is set to keep causing severe humanitarian externali-
ties. Consequently, casualties at the Southern maritime borders 
of the EU will continue to occur in significant numbers. The 
disengagement of European law enforcement assets, the crim-
inalisation of NGOs, and an excessive reliance on the Libyan 
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Coast Guard have all contributed to causing an increase in the 
deadliness of irregular border crossings. As none of these pro-
cesses is likely to be reversed in the near future, the Central 
Mediterranean route will continue to record a significant death 
toll. As the absolute number of crossings is likely to remain 
lower than in previous years, casualties at sea will not reach 
the 2016 peak. The relative deadliness of the route, however, is 
unlikely to significantly decrease in the near future.
Future burden-sharing arrangements ensuring the redistri-
bution of migrants rescued at sea might partly overcome Italy 
and other Southern European countries’ migration crisis fa-
tigue, reducing their current wariness to engage in proactive 
rescue operations. The perceived lack of solidarity from the rest 
of the EU has played a key role in pitting Italian authorities 
against rescue operations and those providing them, as epito-
mised by Rome’s increasing tendency to allow for the disem-
barkation of NGO ships rescuing migrants only after a reloca-
tion agreement with other European partners has been reached. 
Such arrangements, however, are difficult to reach and unlikely 
to be effectively implemented. The September 2019 Valletta 
summit, where only France and Germany committed to share 
the relocation of part of the migrants rescued off the coast of 
Libya with Italy and Malta, is a case in point. Ultimately, effec-
tive migrant redistribution would require a complete overhaul 
of the Dublin regulations, which makes countries of first entry 
responsible for processing asylum applications. Although the 
Von der Leyen commission pledged to revise the European asy-
lum system, sufficient consensus among EU Member States is 
unlikely to emerge. 
Conclusion
The very diverse origins, motivation and legal status of sea-
borne migrants heading to Europe, the geopolitical complex-
ities of the Mediterranean region, and the fragility of the cur-
rent border externalisation arrangements devised by the EU 
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and its Member States belie any accurate forecast of migration 
across the Mediterranean. Keeping these limitations in mind, 
this paper surveyed irregular migration across the Central 
Mediterranean route over the last twenty years to identify some 
enduring dynamics and plausible future scenarios. 
The demographic and the socioeconomic outlook of sub-Sa-
haran Africa and the Middle East suggest that northbound ir-
regular migratory flows to Europe are inevitably set to contin-
ue. In the short term, however, the large-scale mobility flows 
triggered by the Arab uprisings will remain unmatched short of 
any major regional turmoil. Notwithstanding legal and ethical 
concerns, policies of onshore containment aimed at physically 
stopping migrants from reaching European borders will remain 
key instruments in the European Union and Italian migration 
governance toolkit. The combination of persisting migratory 
flows and containment policies will continue to cause casualties 
at sea, marring the Southern maritime borders of the EU with 
significant humanitarian externalities. 
 
6.  The Future of Integration: 
     New Technologies for 
     a Migrant-Centric Approach
Enrico Coletta, Giulia Baistrocchi, Giuseppe Ciarliero, 
Luigi Limone
Migrant* Integration in Europe: Background
The integration of migrants and refugees in Europe 
is currently a complex and demanding challenge. 
A few numbers help achieve a general understanding 
of the scale of the challenge ahead…
As of 1 January 2018, the number of extra-EU nationals legally 
residing in an EU Member State was 22.3 million, representing 
4.4% of the total EU-28 population. Of these, 55% were resid-
ing in only three countries: Germany, Italy and France. These 
same three countries also accounted for almost 70% (~230,000) 
of asylum requests granted in the EU in 20181. To give a sense 
of the composition of non-national citizens per country, the 
Figure 6.1 shows that in 2018 and in most EU Member States 
the majority of non-nationals were extra-EU citizens2. 
* Here, the term “migrants” refers to extra-EU citizens that have migrated to 
the European Union, including people who have been granted asylum in one of  
the Member States.
1 Refers to total positive first instance and final decisions (Eurostat data).
2 Eurostat data.
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Fig. 6.1 - Composition of non-national citizens per country
This figure give us a general understanding of the scale and 
complexity of the challenge ahead: migrant integration. 
Integration has been a hotly debated topic within the field of 
migration. Although the term has been generally referred to the 
adaptation process of immigrants, scholars have yet to agree 
on a consensual understanding of the definition, nature, and 
goals of integration. What is commonly accepted though, is 
that successful integration enables people to reduce inequali-
ties in income, education, and health i as well as to improve 
access to services. According to Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen, 
the most problematic form of inequality is the one he defines 
as “inequality of opportunity”3. It occurs when people living in 
the same society do not have access to the same opportunities. 
It becomes apparent then, that a successful management of the 
integration process is paramount to minimise such inequalities, 
underpin social cohesion, and maximise the political, social and 
economic benefits that integration can bring to the overall de-
velopment of the EU. 
3 A.K. Sen, Development as freedom, Anchor Books, 1999.
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It is beyond the purpose of this essay to provide a literature 
review on the conceptualisation of the migrant and refugee in-
tegration process. What is important to know is that integra-
tion is a multi-dimensional process that encompasses various 
domains. To have a holistic understanding of the integration 
process, all factors that are known to contribute to the integra-
tion of migrants and refugees should be identified and thor-
oughly understood. Integration can also be defined as being a 
multi-actor process. This means that integration requires the 
involvement of a wide variety of actors, from the government 
to the private sector and civil society. No single actor, however 
capable, can take on the challenge of migrant integration on 
its own. As stated in the EU Common Basic Principles for the 
Immigrant document, integration is a two-way process of mu-
tual accommodation by all migrants and by residents of the EU 
Member States.
State-level integration policies have resulted 
in a “variable geometry” Europe…
Each country has its own specificities and the quality of nation-
al integration policies varies widely across European States. At 
the same time, migrants are not all the same. Beneficiaries of 
international protection, for example, face obstacles to lasting 
integration in their new countries that other migrants don’t ever 
have to be confronted with. As a consequence, it is not surpris-
ing that each country must tailor its own integration process 
to its specific context. The European Migration Network has 
recently conducted a study on the state of play of national inte-
gration measures in EU Member States and Norway in 20184. 
As illustrated in the map on the left, a total of 18 Member 
States and Norway adopted measures related to the enhance-
ment of language skills targeted at third-country nationals; 19 
Member States and Norway implemented legislative measures, 
policies and practices to foster labour market integration of 
4 European Migration Network (EMN), Annual Report on Migration and Asylum 
2018, May 2019.
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third-country nationals; while 15 Member States and Norway 
reported new developments regarding improving access to social 
security, social assistance, healthcare, housing, and other basic 
services.
…while the European Union has only been able to 
provide guidelines and common basic principles…
As stated earlier, in the European Union’s immigrant integra-
tion policies are a national competence. Nonetheless, since the 
1999 Treaty of Amsterdam, the EU has periodically set prior-
ities and guidelines for the EU Member States in this area, as 
shown by the Tampere Programme, which highlighted the need 
to define common goals towards a more vigorous integration 
policy for third-country nationals living in the EU. The 2004 
“Common basic principles” document represents another step-
ping stone, as they have guided and continue to guide most 
EU actions in the area of integration. With the signature of the 
Treaty of Lisbon in 2007, the EU and its institutions have re-
ceived the official mandate to provide incentives and support to 
EU Member States with a view to promoting the integration of 
third-country nationals. The latest development in this area is 
the 2016 EU Action Plan on the Integration of Third-Country 
Nationals5 that sets out key policy priorities and specific tools 
to help Member States develop and strengthen their integration 
policies. The revised integration strategy defined in recent years 
comes as a response to the need to intensify long-term respons-
es and consolidate the efforts of all stakeholders involved. An 
important element of the revised approach is the use of tech-
nology for integration purposes. The Commission stated that 
the innovative use of technology, social media and the internet 
needs to be fostered at all stages of the integration process.
5 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of  the Regions, Action Plan on the Integration 
of  Third-Country Nationals”, COM (2016) 377 final, 7 June 2016.
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Information and communication technologies 
are considered to be the key to a better management 
of the integration process, but are European countries 
ready for this?
The use of technology constitutes a new dimension in the study 
of migration and integration processes. The impact of technol-
ogy on migration is undeniable, as it facilitates the process of 
migration in all aspects of the journey, from the pre-migratory 
phase to integration in the host country. Personal computers, 
mobile phones, the Internet and social media have become 
everyday tools for migrants. One notable development has been 
the advent of new technologies such as Artificial Intelligence 
(AI), Big Data, and Blockchain, together with financial technol-
ogy institutions (“Fintech”) using phone-based apps instead of 
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costly physical infrastructures. The potential of these new tech-
nologies to disrupt the sector is only beginning to be recognised 
and exploited. While such technologies have been permeating 
most sectors of developed country economies since the mid-
2010s, they are only recently starting to come into their own 
in the field of migrant and refugee integration. Considering the 
substantial impact of ICT tools on every aspect of the migra-
tion process, digital technologies are seen by the EU as a game 
changer for migration and the integration process.
At the same time though, the use and application of technol-
ogy is not evenly spread across EU countries. As a matter of fact, 
the 2019 Digital Economy and Society Index6 (DESI), in this 
paper used as a proxy for technological readiness and thus as an 
indicator of integration service quality, shows that several EU 
countries score quite poorly. The Index measures Europe’s digital 
performance and tracks the evolution of EU Member States in 
digital competitiveness across five dimensions. What emerges is 
that the speed at which EU countries have improved their digital 
performance over the years is not homogenous. While Finland, 
Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark (“Top performers” clus-
ter in the graph below) scored the highest ratings in DESI 2019 
and are amongst the global leaders in digitalisation, other coun-
tries lag behind considerably in this domain.  
6 The DESI is a composite index that summarises relevant indicators on Europe’s 
digital performance and tracks the evolution of  EU Member States in digital 
competitiveness.
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Among the countries that display shares of non-EU citizens to 
total population between 4% and 8% we also find the clusters 
of “Good performers” and “Urgent intervention needed”. This 
latter cluster includes countries such as Italy and Greece, which 
have high shares of non-EU citizens and a low DESI score. Italy, 
for example, which in 2018 was the second-highest country in 
the EU for number of non-EU28 citizens, is in the bottom five 
DESI scores. We claim that the level of digital readiness should 
be at least close to the current average in countries that display 
high shares of extra-EU citizens (“Urgent intervention needed” 
cluster). Countries in the “Intervention needed” cluster have 
lower shares of extra-EU citizens, but appear to be well below 
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average in terms of digital performance, and thus of the quality 
of services connected to the integration of migrants and refugees.
If we take these results together with the latest (20177) data 
of the European Quality of Government Index (EQI), one of 
the few measures of institutional quality available at the re-
gional level in the European Union, we see a great disparity 
in the quality of national government services. In this context, 
institutional quality is defined as a multi-dimensional concept 
consisting of high impartiality and quality of public service 
delivery, along with low corruption8. According to the EQI, 
while most regions in Northern Europe have remained among 
the top performers in quality of government (e.g. Finland and 
the Netherlands), recent years have seen steps backwards in nu-
merous southern regions, particularly in Italy (which is ranked 
second-worst), Greece and Spain. 
While it is true that new technologies may be the key enabler 
for designing and implementing better integration strategies, 
countries must also be well-equipped to take advantage of what 
digital innovation can offer. For this to be possible, better poli-
cies are crucial. Currently, there appears to be a plethora of EU-
level initiatives that although successful, cannot be coherently 
linked with one another in an integrated fashion. This could 
be the result of an ineffective policy framework that prevents 
governments and the wider society from consistently cooperat-
ing towards a common goal. It appears, therefore, that the EU 
as a whole needs improvement not only to be able to compete 
on the global stage of digital competitiveness, but also to tackle 
more efficiently and effectively its migration and integration 
challenges: issues that are undermining the very essence of the 
European Union project. Moreover, since services targeting mi-
grants are often universal services which support citizenship, 
a general improvement of public policies improving migrant 
7 N. Charron, V. Lapuent, and P. Annoni, “Measuring Quality of  Government 
in EU Regions Across Space and Time”, Papers in Regional Science, DOI: 
10.1111/pirs.12437, 2019.
8 European Quality of  Government, Index 2017.
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citizenship would surely produce positive externalities for the 
community as a whole. 
How Technologies Can Improve Integration 
of Migrants and Refugees 
The application of ICTs to the process of integration is 
not homogenous across Europe… 
Despite the lack of a specific policy framework, several bot-
tom-up initiatives have spread across Europe to tackle the inte-
gration issue, especially during and after the 2014-2015 refugee 
crisis. In order to evaluate the state of the art of the current 
migrant integration process, we have selected 60 of these in-
itiatives that use technology to various degrees to address the 
challenges and specificities presented by each different domain 
of the integration process. 
…there exist several domains of the integration process 
of migrants and refugees that must be addressed…
As anticipated in earlier sections, the integration of migrants 
and refugees is a multi-dimensional process that covers several 
domains. One way to look at it is through the framework de-
veloped by Strang and Ager (2010)9, which has proven to be a 
good theorisation of what the criteria, processes, and contexts 
of integration are. The framework is structured around four 
main key areas: Means and markers, Social connections networks, 
Facilitators, and Foundation. 
The indicators within the first area of Means and Markers 
include the domains of Employment, Education, Housing, 
and Health. These four domains refer to the “public sphere” 
9 A. Strang and A. Ager,” Refugee integration: Emerging trends and remaining 
agendas”, Journal of  Refugee Studies, vol. 23, 2010, pp. 589-607.
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of integration10. These domains are considered to be “markers” 
because success in these categories is an indication of positive 
integration outcomes; and “means” because success in these do-
mains is likely to positively influence and contribute to the wid-
er integration process. These four domains both demonstrate 
progress towards integration and support to achievements in 
other areas.
The second area of Social connections networks emphasises 
the importance of relationships in the process of migrant and 
refugee integration. These domains refer to the more “private 
sphere” of integration11. The framework identifies three main 
different forms of relationships that are important to the inte-
gration process: social bonds, social bridges, and social links. 
“Social bonds” refers to connections with others with a shared 
sense of identity; “social bridges” refers to connections with 
people of different backgrounds; and “social links” refers to 
connections with institutions, including local and central gov-
ernment services. “Bonds” and “bridges” describe relationships 
between individuals within a society and can be understood 
as ‘horizontal’ relationships. Social links refer to the “vertical” 
relationships between people and the institutions of the society 
in which they live.
The third area of Facilitators includes the competences that 
are required for individuals to effectively integrate into the wider 
community. According to the Strang and Ager (2010)12 frame-
work these are “Language”, “Cultural knowledge”, and “Safety 
and security”. Knowledge of the local language and culture are 
crucial indicators of integration. It is interesting to note that 
cultural knowledge refers to migrants and refugees obtaining 
knowledge of the dominant local culture as well as locals ac-
quiring knowledge of the circumstances and culture of migrants.
10 S. Lomba, “Legal status and refugee integration: A UK perspective”, Journal of  
Refugee Studies, vol. 23, 2010, pp. 415-436.
11 A. Ager and A. Strang, “Understanding integration: A conceptual framework”, 
Journal of  Refugee Studies, vol. 21, 2008, pp. 166-191. 
12 A. Strang, and A. Ager (2010). 
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Fig. 6.2 - The integration process framework
The domain of “Safety and security” deals with issues of racial 
harassment and fear of crime. Research confirms the impor-
tance of a sense of personal safety and security in allowing peo-
ple to engage with services and with other people in order to 
establish their lives and to integrate. It is important to include 
a fourth indicator in this category: “Digital skills”. The addi-
tion of digital skills, not originally present in the model, reflects 
the significant developments in new ICTs that have taken place 
since the original indicators were published. This reflects the 
fact that nowadays access to people, services, and rights is often 
facilitated by or dependent on technology. 
The fourth area of Foundation assesses the degree to which 
migrants and refugees are provided with the basis for full and 
equal engagement within their host society13. Ideas of citizen-
13 A. Ager and A. Strang (2008). 
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ship and nationality – and their associated rights – fundamen-
tally shape what counts as integration in a specific context. The 
acquisition of citizenship and exercise of the rights and actions 
this entails (such as voting) in itself provides an important bed-
rock to the integration of any individual in a society.
…and there are hundreds of stand-alone bottom-up 
initiatives that set out to address the challenges 
of integration by integrating ICTs in their business 
models…
On the basis of the framework we analysed in the previous par-
agraph, we will identify some of the most interesting initiatives 
that address the challenges of the integration of migrants and 
refugees by leveraging the synergies created by the application 
of information and communication technologies. 
We were able to map 60 bottom-up initiatives, which are 
shown in Index I. Initiatives were identified across all domains 
included in the integration framework presented in earlier 
paragraphs. What emerges is a quite diversified environment. 
While there are projects that try to cover several domains of 
the integration process (e.g. initiatives 3 and 11), other focus 
on just one (e.g. initiatives 5 and 6). For what concerns imple-
mented digital tools, there appears to be a greater diffusion of 
solutions that mostly use “apps and web-based platforms” as 
well as “websites and social media”. Across our sample only a 
handful of projects implemented more advanced digital tools 
such as AI, Blockchain, Fintech, and Big Data, and mainly to 
address the areas of Means and Markers and Facilitators. For 
what concerns the “most addressed domains”, it appears that 
a good number of mapped initiatives are trying to tackle the 
challenges posed by “Employment (1a)”, “Social Bridges (2b)” 
and “Education (1b)” through the use of social media, apps and 
web-based platforms. 
Through desk research and interviews with experts, a short-
list of 12 projects that are considered to be examples of best 
practices in the integration of migrants and refugees in Europe 
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was compiled and is presented below. Each initiative focuses 
on one or more domains of the integration process and has a 
distinctive way of addressing the challenge at hand. 
Some initiatives use Artificial Intelligence to identify the 
ideal country of relocation…
As highlighted by our research, one 
of the biggest challenges in the inte-
gration process of migrants and ref-
ugees is access to the job market. We 
mapped two initiatives that developed 
a software that uses big data and ma-
chine learning to identify the coun-
try of relocation in which a migrant 
would have the best chances of finding a job, thus facilitating 
integration. The IPL algorithm (Initiative 5), developed by the 
Immigration Policy Lab (Stanford and Zurich Universities), is 
an algorithm that accurately predicts where a migrant has more 
possibilities to find a job. The algorithm has been tested in the 
United States and in Switzerland and it led to a significant in-
crease in the employment prospects of migrants and refugees in 
both countries. The second project (Initiative 6), named after 
Annie Moore, a famous Irish immigrant to the United States, 
is an artificial Intelligence-powered software, developed by the 
universities of Oxford and Lind, which is able to match refugees 
to specific locations by using data such as their needs, skills, and 
the number of available country resources and opportunities.
…or to match migrants and refugees 
to opportunities that will 
accelerate their integration.
Rafiqi (Initiative 13) is a mul-
ti-awarded online platform that lev-
erages artificial intelligence to match 
migrants and refugees to opportunities 
that will accelerate their integration. 
The Future of Migration to Europe134
The creator, an immigrant from the Middle East who moved to 
Europe 10 years ago and relocated to the UK, identified some 
of the challenges that are currently hindering the realisation of 
refugee integration prospects. These include, “firstly, the fact 
that a single platform where newcomers can navigate the range 
of opportunities available to them, and where NGOs, univer-
sities, employers and volunteering mentors can access and filter 
refugee talent, appears to be missing”. Secondly, that newcom-
ers’ unawareness of the right opportunities results in them be-
ing unemployed or being overqualified for what they are doing 
and thirdly, while there are significant efforts by governments 
and NGOs to match refugees to opportunities in countries like 
Germany and the Netherlands, scaling these efforts cannot be 
done manually given the number and diversity of both refu-
gee profiles and available opportunities. Therefore, the Rafiqi 
platform sets out to address these challenges by allowing users 
to discover and navigate government services themselves and 
to be matched in real-time and in a customised fashion to the 
services that better suit their profiles and needs. The product is 
currently being pilot-tested among a selected group of refugees 
in London and Berlin with services including access to jobs, 
job coaching programmes, technical training, language/cultural 
training, access to mentors, accredited certifications, and uni-
versity degrees.
Others rely on face-to-face interaction by matching 
young migrants with experienced local mentors 
to find a job…
DUO for a JOB (Initiative 20) is a 
non-profit association that was created 
on the basis of a two-fold observation: 
on the one hand, Belgium has one of the 
weakest activity rates in Europe for peo-
ple over 50 years of age and on the oth-
er hand, young people with a migrant 
background are faced with common 
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issues when accessing the labour market. Since 2013, DUO for 
a JOB has been addressing this twofold challenge by putting 
these two groups of people in touch through the use of a soft-
ware that matches young migrants to experienced mentors. The 
association offers a cultural and intergenerational mentoring 
programme by creating duos: young job seekers with a migrant 
background (the mentees) are paired with people over the age 
of 50 (mentors), ideally from the same professional sector so 
that the mentors can support and guide their mentee in the job 
hunting. With offices in Brussels, Liège and Ghent, DUO for 
a JOB has formed over 2,200 duos thanks to more than 750 
mentors. According to Advocacy Director Julie Bodson, 73% 
of mentees have enjoyed a positive outcome (short-term perma-
nent contract, traineeship, training programmes) within the 12 
months following their coaching. The objective of the associa-
tion is to eliminate inequalities in access to the labour market 
for migrants and to combat discrimination by re-creating social 
cohesion, understanding and local solidarity. 
…and some others support them 
in preparing personalised skills 
profile.
Skilllab (Initiative 1) is a skill assess-
ment tool to identify and document the 
professional skills of job seekers quick-
ly and in any language. As stated by its 
Managing Director Ulrich Scharf, 
our experience is mostly in the areas of employment and adult 
education since we specifically work with organisations to sup-
port refugees and migrants find pathways to sustainable careers. 
We believe that in the long-term, employment itself is perhaps 
the most important domain of the integration process because 
of its outsized impact on other domains. 
Skilllab uses Artificial intelligence to interview users (in their na-
tive language) about the skills and knowledge that they acquired 
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over the course of their lives. A mobile application enables users 
to capture past experiences of any kind and perform a skill as-
sessment for all those past experiences. The resulting skill profiles 
are automatically generated and professionally translated into the 
language of the user’s choice, producing detailed, professionally 
formatted documentation to be used with career counselling ser-
vices and employment and education providers. Scharf continues 
by stating that although employment of migrants does receive 
much attention from the public sector, many authorities with 
significant migrant and refugee populations are focusing on a 
one-size-fits all approach to service provision that, by failing to 
provide highly personalised services to the individual, is at best 
ineffective and at worst counter-productive, leading to longer 
unemployment periods, and the shoe-horning of migrants into 
low-skilled, low-wage positions that neither provide the migrant 
with growth opportunity, nor take advantage of their skills on 
the labour market.
Some focus on providing relevant and high-quality 
information to migrants and refugees…
Refugee.Info (Initiative 11) is a digital 
and interactive platform which lever-
ages social media and social networks 
to communicate directly with refugees 
and people seeking asylum in Italy. The 
main goal of the project is to help refu-
gees and asylum seekers access accurate 
information concerning their rights and 
safety, including asylum procedures, enrolling in school, and ac-
cessing health care and the labour market. Refugee.Info (RI) is 
the European instance of Signpost, a joint initiative launched 
by the International Rescue Committee and Mercy Corps in 
2015 at the height of the European refugee crisis. This initiative 
was designed to respond directly to the needs of refugees arriv-
ing in Greece with “nothing but their cell phones”. “Since then” 
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states RI Project Officer Elena Caracciolo, “we have expanded 
our activities across Europe and we have already reached almost 
1.4 million refugees and asylum seekers in Bulgaria, Greece, 
Hungary, Italy and Serbia”. Thanks to its partners, free Wi-Fi 
stations have been installed in areas of high concentration of 
refugees (Ventimiglia, Como, Rome, Foggia, and Milan), to en-
sure internet connection and allow users to access the platform. 
According to Caracciolo “refugees and asylum seekers use social 
media outlets as their primary source of information. The use 
of social media helps us dialogue in real time with people and 
provide a personalised support. For example, between March 
2018 and October 2019, we’ve received ~30.000 messages on 
Messenger from over 4.000 unique users and we were able to 
achieve a within-15h 96% response rate (Facebook Analytics)”. 
The Project Officers continues by sharing some findings of the 
recently conducted internal impact report by stating that “76% 
of respondents believe that they are better informed after using 
Refugee.Info and that the information provided is trustworthy. 
This is particularly significant when considering that the target 
population is distrustful of information on social media when it 
does not come from peers”. 
…while others help them simplify complex 
bureaucracy, improve their digital skills…
Bureaucrazy (Initiative 2) is an app de-
signed by two Syrian asylum seekers that 
are on a mission to simplify German 
bureaucracy not just for all the people 
who have sought asylum there since 
2013 but also ordinary migrants. The 
app combines three basic functions: a 
translation service that renders German 
official documents into Arabic and English, a multiple-choice 
decision tree for frequently encountered problems, and a map-
ping service that sends applicants to the right council office. The 
hope of the founders is that their product could “guide those 
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arriving in Germany through everything 
from opening their own bank account, 
renting a flat, applying for a univer-
sity course or registering at a job cen-
tre”. The app has been developed at 
ReDI School (Initiative 56), a Berlin 
non-profit “school for digital integra-
tion” that teaches technology and how 
to code to asylum seekers and newcomers in Germany. It offers 
quality training and the chance to collaborate with the German 
start-up and digital industry. The aim is to provide students 
with valuable digital skills and a strong network of tech leaders, 
students and alumni to help create new opportunities for all. 
Since its foundation the School has expanded to Munich and 
Copenhagen and is also able to offer free online courses thanks 
to its partners Microsoft and Cisco Networking Academy. 
…or learn the language and local culture.
According to Co-founder & CMO @
SPEAK, Mariana Brilhante, the great-
est challenges migrants face in the inte-
gration process in their new countries 
are language barriers, being away from 
friends and family, ethnic and religious 
discrimination, and complex bureaucrat-
ic processes. These are the domains of the 
integration process that SPEAK, a Portuguese startup (Initiative 
17), focuses on. SPEAK brings together newcomers and locals 
living in the same city through community-led language groups 
and cultural exchange events. Through these experiences, par-
ticipants learn from each other, explore common interests and 
make new friends, breaking down barriers and tackling preju-
dice in their cities along the way. As people learn new languag-
es together, they are also breaking down barriers and creating 
strong and meaningful relationships. Participants rely on these 
new relationships to seek help to solve various problems, such as 
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translating a CV, babysitting, renting a house or even finding a 
job. Relationships that are formed and experienced face-to-face 
have a much more profound impact on people’s lives compared 
to relationships formed online. SPEAK uses an Online2Offline 
model to deliver its experience. Most of its processes are managed 
online through an platform developed in-house to ensure greater 
efficiency, minimisation of fixed costs, and greater scalability. The 
learning and sharing experiences happen face to face, allowing 
participants to establish a close and meaningful relationship with 
one another. The project appears to be particularly interesting 
also for its scalability. Over the past five years, SPEAK has be-
come a community of over 30,000 people from 160 different 
nationalities who are spread over 30 cities globally. 
Finally, some others do not create solutions directly 
but rather act as aggregators of experts and 
entrepreneurs…
Aware of the importance of technology as a tool to tackle the 
migrant integration issue, Techfugees (Initiative 3) is an inter-
national non-profit organisation that acts as a global platform 
to find solutions to the migrant crisis. The organisation defines 
itself “not as a platform that creates solu-
tions directly but rather one that creates 
bridges and links between experts in 
order to implement high-tech solutions 
to the migrant-crisis and help displaced 
people to meet their needs in terms 
of access to rights information, access 
to employment, access to education, 
health and social inclusion”. To do so, 
Techfugees organizes meetups and hack-
athons and it now counts a community 
of almost 18,000 innovators from across 
the world. Among the initiatives that 
were supported by Techfugees there are 
Integreat (Initiative 10), one of the largest 
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local information apps for newcomers in 
Germany, and Antura and the Letters 
(Initiative 60), a free and open source 
smartphone game designed in Germany 
to help refugee Syrian children learn 
reading, no matter where they are and 
with no need for Internet connection. 
These few examples show us that 
there are numerous unconnected initi-
atives with a strong know-how, high potential and innovative 
ideas that if taken together and embedded in a coherent and 
holistic policy framework could be applied on a larger scale and 
benefit the entire European continent. 
The Increased Role of the State in the Digital Era 
Technology is essential, but why is it so hard 
for governments to use it? What should they do? 
As shown in the previous section, there are plenty of interesting 
initiatives and solutions developed to support the integration of 
migrants through digital and innovative tools. Despite all the 
excellent impacts on the community that such bottom-up ex-
periences can bring, there is still an urgent need for the State to 
drive and encourage these developments. As a matter of fact, the 
digital revolution has changed the world in unprecedented ways, 
impacting significantly the way public and social services are de-
livered to citizens. In addition to that, digitalisation is expected 
to play a key role in leveraging the transformation of the public 
sector at large, given its potential to increase productivity and 
inclusiveness of service production and delivery in public wel-
fare areas. Moreover, e-Services reduce the time spent in public 
administrations and this encourages people to use them14.
14 European Commission, Digital Public Services: https://ec.europa.eu/
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Fig. 6.3 - e-Government users between 2013 and 2018 
(% of total EU citizens)
In this respect, over the past year all EU countries improved 
their digital performance. For example, Finland, Sweden, the 
Netherlands, and Denmark scored the highest ratings in DESI 
2019 and are among the global leaders in digitalisation. Some 
other countries however still have a long way to go, and the EU 
as a whole needs improvement to be able to compete on the 
global stage. 
The Figure 6.4 below shows that while digital technologies 
have made remarkable advances, the understanding of digital 
transformation in the public sector in some countries has not. 
digital-single-market/en/digital-public-services-scoreboard 
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Fig. 6.4 – The Digital Economy and Society Index (2019)
The low rate of digital innovation in some countries suggests 
that there are deeper structural barriers and challenges to face, 
which are also related to the conservative and risk-averse tradi-
tions of the public sector, as also demonstrated by an INSEAD/
EY study analysing the black box of digital transformation in 
governments15. Together with the frequent absence of sound 
policy logic and the complexities in introducing cutting-edge 
technologies, the black box in technology implementation is 
deeply linked with the public service culture, which can be a 
major barrier to digital innovation as it rarely involves innova-
tion, experimentation, and risk-taking.
The above demonstrates that, when faced with the challenges 
of creating the digitally enabled public sector of the future, gov-
ernments have some critical aspects to consider. Firstly, technol-
ogies have the potential to help governments create a safer envi-
ronment for all their citizens, while keeping relevant and strategic 
15 Inside the black box - Journey mapping digital innovation in government: https://
centres.insead.edu/innovation-policy/documents/InsidetheBlackBox.pdf
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interests safe. Finding a balance between the necessary values and 
rights for democratic functioning of the society and the protec-
tion of personal privacy is crucial. Strengthening surveillance on 
citizens through Big Data applications, Artificial Intelligence 
(AI) and machine learning introduces significant restrictions on 
private life and the protection of personal data. This could par-
ticularly be the case for third-country nationals living in a host 
country, as technologies can be used to better identify them for 
security reasons, register them into specific databases, and exer-
cise control on their movements and personal lives. 
Secondly, governments should take into consideration that 
many of today’s most fundamental challenges can be tackled 
more efficiently through the exploitation of smart infrastruc-
tures, as they offer a way to harness the latest technologies to 
obtain maximum value and find more sustainable solutions to 
global challenges, such as urbanisation, climate change, and 
migration management. As regards in particular the integration 
of third-country nationals, smart infrastructures can reduce the 
distance between migrants and service providers, promote the 
creation of innovative models for diversity management, and 
improve management of resources through smarter spending 
and investment in targeted programs and services for long-term, 
sustainable inclusion. In this respect, smart cities projects be-
come key. They apply technologies to find vision-driven, com-
munity-based solutions to the most urgent challenges posed 
by globalisation. Through a technologically-focused vision, the 
cities of the future will contribute to reforming governments to 
successfully implement their economic vision, while also estab-
lishing stronger participatory networks and improved commu-
nication tools for more inclusive societies. 
Thirdly, the public sector should improve capabilities in the 
public sector and re-imagine work in order to achieve better 
efficiency, elevate customer focus, and strengthen diversity and 
inclusion. This means that governments should invest more 
time and resources in strengthening the digital skills of their 
citizens. Accelerating citizens’ upskilling or reskilling towards 
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the needs introduced by the digital revolution is therefore cru-
cial. In this respect, third-country nationals and citizens can be 
introduced together into education pathways to develop and 
improve digital skills and create high-quality training networks 
for the creation of new opportunities for all.
While technologies can sometimes have some drawbacks, 
such as restrictions on personal data and private life, they offer 
many opportunities to the public sector and their role is be-
coming crucial in our everyday life. As a result, governments 
should consider the possibilities of harnessing ICTs to rethink 
the way in which their services are delivered to the public, with 
the aim of putting citizens at the core of their actions as well as 
strengthening citizen engagement through the creation of in-
clusive models and platforms.
The answer is: Rethinking integration through 
migrant-centricity 
With regard to the integration of third-country nationals, re-
sults taken from Section 2 show that bottom-up approaches of-
fer great examples of how technologies can be implemented to 
foster different aspects of the migrant integration process, from 
facilitating access to rights and information, education and the 
labour market to language facilitation and the promotion of 
social connections and links. However, bottom-up initiatives 
are not sufficient to promote migrant integration by themselves 
and they should therefore be supported by the States through 
well-structured policy strategies. Taking into consideration 
the needs deriving from the challenges posed by migrant in-
tegration, EU governments and public administrations are in-
creasingly mandated to support bottom-up initiatives not only 
through the creation of platforms and ecosystems - where re-
sources, means and good practices can be exchanged - but also 
through the creation of a policy framework capable of nurtur-
ing innovation and digitalisation.
Within the context of a renovated and digitally enabled pub-
lic sector, citizens – as well as third country nationals – might 
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be viewed as customers and be incorporated in decision-making 
processes, programmes and services that involve and affect every-
one. To renew their focus on citizen engagement, governments 
are therefore required to empower their citizens to acquire digital 
skills and engage in a meaningful dialogue to promote new prac-
tices aiming to better serve their citizens while also maximising 
the profits deriving from the implementation of citizen-friendly 
solutions. Fully engaged citizens can make significant contribu-
tions to policies and programs related to every aspect of city life 
and government services, as well as fostering innovative approach-
es to tackle public policy challenges in a more efficient way. 
As regards migrant integration, multi-stakeholder approach-
es through digital innovation have the potential to put migrants 
and their needs at the core of public policy strategies. Migrants 
will therefore have the opportunity to show their preferences, 
advance their needs and interests, and choose the best solu-
tions in terms of opportunities for social inclusion, as regards 
for example access to the labour market, language facilitation, 
co-housing, financial support, welfare, and healthcare systems. 
Within this new framework, EU governments and public ad-
ministrations are mandated to facilitate access to public and so-
cial services by developing specific support tools and platforms 
for integration which will have the capacity to embed the good 
practices demonstrated by bottom-up initiatives across Europe.
Conclusion
What should migrant integration in Europe 
look like in the future? 
The integration of migrants and refugees across the EU remains 
a challenge for both public authorities and local communities. 
As we have seen above, to date there is no uniform, holistic ap-
proach to migrant integration and so far, Member States have 
implemented approaches focusing on different aspects of the 
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integration process. In order to support the implementation of 
well-structured and efficient integration policies, EU public ad-
ministrations will have to take into consideration the key role 
which can be played by technology. While facilitating the man-
agement of integration actions as well as improving autonomy 
and inclusion and, consequently, the lives of migrants, these 
tools may also help alleviate the tasks of public administrations 
and local authorities. 
Technology constitutes an important resource for the em-
ployability and integration of immigrants. ICTs can be used by 
immigrants to look for a job, get their qualifications recognised, 
learn the language and culture of the host country, create social 
bonds, develop new skills, and access information about avail-
able education, health or other services or about legislative and 
administrative information on the host country. Given ICT’s 
potential in designing better integration strategies, EU Member 
States must be well-equipped to take advantage of what digital 
innovation can offer. In this respect, EU governments and ad-
ministrations are required to make new efforts to understand 
how digitalisation is changing the way social services should be 
organised and delivered, thus focusing their attention on put-
ting citizens at the core of their actions and finding practical 
solutions to social challenges. 
Ensuring a migrant-centric approach is key to promote the 
sustainability of policy actions in the so-called digital era. By 
allowing citizens to participate in the definition of contents 
and strategies, EU governments and public administrations can 
re-appropriate their power to deliver efficient services to face 
complex problems, such as the integration of migrants. To do 
so, they should be able to implement a multi-stakeholder ap-
proach involving public and private actors as well as third-sec-
tor organisations and harness ICT’s potential in fostering social 
inclusion. Specifically, EU governments must ensure that solu-
tions are designed by taking into consideration the needs of the 
people who face the challenges, i.e. migrants and refugees who 
should be at the heart of the actions. Furthermore, EU public 
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actors may elaborate strategies which are scalable from the na-
tional to the local level, transferable to other areas geographical-
ly, and adaptable to the changing needs of today’s society.
In conclusion, digital solutions can lead the way towards bet-
ter customised services which can benefit both third-country 
nationals and EU societies and promote the implementation 
of concrete action plans to ensure the long-term sustainabili-
ty of migrant integration processes, with public actors setting 
standards and guidelines while keeping migrants at the centre 
of their policy strategy. 
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Annex I: Mapping of Bottom-Up Initiatives 
Across the Integration Framework
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